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Introduction
It is widely recognized that innovation is a key issue for rmscompetitiveness
and countries economic growth. The European Union (EU) includes research and in-
novation as fundamental aspects of smart, sustainable and inclusive growthin the
Horizon 2020 strategy (European Commission, 2014), and the American Strategy
for Innovation reckons that the Americas future economic growth and international
competitiveness depend on their capacity to innovate (White House, 2014). In this
context, and given the growing competition environment, and innovation risks and
costs, frequently, rms consider collaborative strategies to innovate. These collab-
orative strategies can take di¤erent forms, as research joint ventures (RJVs), verti-
cal and horizontal mergers, acquisitions, among others. Nevertheless, these kind of
agreements constitute a major concern for competition authorities, since cooperative
behaviour may have undesirable repercussions on market competition and, there-
fore, on consumer welfare. Hence, my research interests are focused on industrial
organization and economics of innovation, particularly in the analysis of cooperative
innovation strategies and market structure.
The rst chapter, entitled Domestic and International Research Joint Ventures:
The E¤ect of Collusion(joint with Ricardo Flores-Fillol and Bernd Theilen),1 analy-
ses the e¤ect of RJVs on consumer welfare in an international context, considering
the threat that RJVs can be used to reach collusive agreements in the product mar-
ket. The main novelty of our analysis is to study the di¤erentiated e¤ect of domestic
and international RJVs, since this kind of agreements can be used as a subterfuge to
sustain tacit collusion agreements in the product market, the e¤ect of collusion may
di¤er between domestic and international agreements. The recent literature shows
that RJVs with collusion harm consumers. However, our results introduce a quali-
cation to this statement: international RJVs with collusion might be benecial for
consumers when internationalization costs are high. The EU and US competition
policy advises against RJVs that facilitate collusion on the grounds of their expected
negative e¤ects. Our results suggest that antitrust authorities should distinguish
1This chapter is published in Economics Letters 122 (2014), 79-83.
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between domestic and international RJVs and, in certain cases, be more benevolent
with international RJVs.
The second chapter, Innovation and Horizontal Mergers in a Vertically Related
Industryanalyses the e¤ects of horizontal mergers on innovation and consumer wel-
fare in a vertically related industry. Firms often argue that mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) constitute leverage for innovation. However, M&A may reduce competition,
especially horizontal mergers. Therefore, it is relevant to understand and assess the
consequences of horizontal mergers for the innovative potential of rms. This pa-
per analyses the e¤ects of horizontal mergers on innovation and consumer welfare
in a vertically related industry context, in which downstream rms compete for cus-
tomers with a di¤erentiated nal good and can undertake R&D activities to reduce
their unit costs. Upstream and downstream horizontal mergers can take place. The
results suggest that competition authorities aiming to promote innovation and con-
sumer welfare should treat upstream and downstream mergers di¤erently, since hor-
izontal mergers between upstream rms are detrimental to innovation and consumer
welfare. By contrast, it is shown that downstream horizontal mergers can be both
innovation and consumer welfare enhancing in su¢ ciently small markets. Thus, pol-
icy makers should evaluate the market characteristics under downstream integration.
Finally, in the third chapter, entitled The Determinants of Partner Choice for
Cooperative Innovation: The E¤ect of Competition, is analysed empirically the ef-
fect of competition intensity as a determinant of cooperative partner choice. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the rst attempt to study the relationship between
research and development (R&D) cooperation and direct measures of competition
intensity. Competition intensity is measured by the number of competitors in the
rms core market and the price elasticity reported by rms. Using information from
German rms for 2011, our results show that competition intensity is a determi-
nant for di¤erent types of collaborative innovation (e.g., with customers, suppliers,
competitors, universities, or rms of the same group). Overall, the e¤ect of compe-
tition is negative for cooperation with universities, customers and rms of the same
group, and positive for cooperation with suppliers and competitors (and ambigu-
ous for cooperation with consultants). Competition negatively a¤ects partnerships
vi
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with customers and universities, which look for radical innovation and involve high
risks of disclosure. By contrast, competition positively inuences partnerships with
suppliers and competitors, which pursue incremental innovation and which involve a
symmetric risk of information disclosure.
vii
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Chapter 1
Domestic and International
Research Joint Ventures: The
E¤ect of Collusion
Jointly written with Ricardo Flores-Fillol and Bernd Theilen. A shorter version of
this chapter is published in the Economics Letters 122 (2014), 79-83.
This chapter beneted from valuable comments and suggestions from Nikolaos
Georgantzís, Rafael Moner-Colonques, Jo Seldeslachts, and an anonymous referee.
Discussions during the congresses XXVII Jornadas de Economía Industrial at Uni-
versidad de Murcia (Spain), and during our seminar at Universitat Rovira i Virgili
in Reus (Spain) also helped to improve this chapter.
1.1 Introduction
Cooperative R&D among enterprises is common practice in all sectors of the economy,
particularly in the high-tech sector. These cooperation agreements in the form of
research joint ventures (RJVs) enable rms to exploit synergies, share individual
risks, internalize R&D spillovers, increase e¢ ciencies, and promote innovation. As a
consequence, new products become available and existing products are produced at
lower prices, which benets consumers and raises social welfare. For this reason and
1
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1.1. INTRODUCTION
regardless of the characteristics of each RJV, regulatory agencies have mainly ruled
in favor of these agreements. RJVs are typically exempted from restrictive antitrust
rules, in both the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) (Carree et
al., 2010; White, 2010). However, there are two reasons that call into question
the common practice when assessing the e¤ects of RJVs. First, there is increasing
evidence that cooperation in R&D is used to facilitate collusion in the product market
(Duso et al., forthcoming; Goeree and Helland, 2010; Oxley et al., 2009; Martin,
1995). Second, with the globalization of the economy, an increasing number of RJVs
bring together rms located in di¤erent countries (Upho¤ and Gilman, 2010). Such
international RJVs have di¤erent e¤ects than domestic RJVs. The objective of this
paper is to analyze the e¤ect of RJVs in an international context, considering the
threat that they can be used to reach collusive agreements in the product market.
Current regulatory practice regarding RJVs in the US is based on the Sherman
Antitrust Act, embodied in the US Code. Initially, under this code, guidelines were
developed to permit mergers or to impose conditions on them, as well as to identify
and prohibit cartels due to their clear detriment to competition. Nowadays, it also
acts as the legal framework for regulatory authorities to determine whether a joint
venture undermines market competition. The Report and Recommendationsof the
Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007, pp. 378) identied over 30 statutory or
judicial exemptions (or partial exemptions) from the antitrust laws, including cooper-
ative RJVs (White, 2010). In the EU, the legality of joint ventures is also determined
by general rules of competition under the EU Competition Law. More precisely, arti-
cle 101 (3) of The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (2010) facilitates the creation
of joint ventures with the aim of fostering technical and economic progress. As in
the US, RJVs in the EU are generally exempted from antitrust regulations (Gugler
and Siebert, 2004).1
In the past, the scope of RJVs has only been limited when they have been proved
to favor collusive practices in the product market. In these cases, antitrust legislation
procedures have been applied to penalize these anticompetitive practices. In the US,
a rule of reason is applied. Fact-nders are required to balance the potential adverse
1In the rst half of the 1980s, multiple block exemption regulations were issued, including RJVs
(Carree et al., 2010). However, over the past two decades, EU antitrust and merger policies have
placed a greater emphasis on consumer welfare, particularly through a tighter economic analysis.
2
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
INNOVATION, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND COOPERATIVE R&D STRATEGIES 
Guiomar Ibáñez Zárate 
 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION
and positive e¤ects of RJVs to determine whether their net e¤ect is likely to be
benecial or harmful to consumers (Piriano, 2008).2 Because of their detrimental
competitive e¤ects, suits have been brought against the following RJVs: (i) CITGO
Petroleum and Motiva (in 2006), an RJV between Shell, Texaco, and Saudi Rening,
and (ii) Equilon Enterprises (in 2007), another RJV between Texaco and Shell.
However, in both cases the application of the rule of reason led to the dismissal of
the suits (Goeree and Helland, 2010). In the EU, in the period 1964-2004, suits
have been brought only against two joint ventures (Carree et al., 2010). However, in
both cases the agreements were not found to have infringed article 101, and neither
decision was appealed. To the best of our knowledge, there is no case in which
anticompetitive practices were reported for RJVs.
Current industrial policy tends to favor domestic RJVs as compared to interna-
tional RJVs. For example, US domestic RJVs are accorded more lenient antitrust
treatment by the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) to give American
rms a cooperative advantage over foreign rms. While some authors defend the
creation of "national champions" (Marvel, 1980; Krugman, 1984; Chou, 1986), oth-
ers defend free competition and equal treatment for domestic and international rms
(Ray, 1981; Sakakibara and Porter, 2001; Hollis, 2003). The majority of empirical
studies support the latter rationale (Clougherty and Zhang, 2008). In this paper, we
assess the possibility of giving a di¤erent treatment to domestic and international
RJVs.
Using di¤erent methodologies, three recent empirical papers show that RJVs
are often used as a subterfuge to sustain tacit collusion agreements in the product
market. First, using US data, Duso et al. (forthcoming) show that RJVs involving
direct competitors can lead to collusion in the product market. The authors conclude
that RJVs have led to a signicant reduction in market output in 29% of the cases
included in their sample. By contrast, RJVs among non-competitors are found to be
welfare-enhancing. Second, also using US data, Goeree and Helland (2010) examine
the potential use of RJVs as a vehicle to facilitate collusion. They exploit a recent
change in US leniency policy aimed at making collusive agreements less sustainable
and examine its e¤ects on RJV formation. They nd that the number of RJVs has
2The rule of reason has been applied on a regular basis since the Dagher case in 2005. This rule
of reason approach requires an inquiry into all the characteristics of the relevant market.
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1.1. INTRODUCTION
fallen signicantly since this policy change, suggesting illegal practices associated
to these agreements. On average, the probability of joining a RJV has fallen by
34% among telecommunications rms, by 33% among computer and semiconductor
manufacturers, and by 27% among petroleum rening rms. Finally, Oxley et al.
(2009) analyze how R&D-related alliances in the telecommunications equipment and
electronics industries a¤ect the stock markets evaluation of rival rms. If an alliance
is expected to enhance the resource portfolio of partner rms, i.e., making them
stronger competitors, this should lead to negative abnormal returns for rivals when
the alliance is announced. If an alliance is expected to facilitate a reduction in
competitive intensity, then this should lead to positive abnormal returns for rivals
because they will also benet from the attenuation of competitive pressures. The
authors nd evidence that some alliances are indeed expected to soften competition,
especially in the case of horizontal alliances in concentrated industries. However,
their results show that cross-border alliances appear to have a procompetitive e¤ect3.
Our analysis of international RJVs reinforces this result.
We propose a theoretical model of RJV formation in an international context
when collusion can occur. The main novelty of our analysis is to study the e¤ect of
international RJVs with collusion. The e¤ect of RJVs and collusion is analyzed in
the seminal paper by dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988), which shows that RJVs
can be welfare-enhancing when the spillovers are large enough. In a setting without
collusion, Suzumura (1992) and Kamien et al. (1992) extend the model described in
dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) to more general forms of R&D cooperation and
market structures.4 Martin (1995) considers tacit collusion in the product market in
a Cournot duopoly model where rms can cooperate in R&D, showing that RJVs are
used to sustain collusion. This e¤ect can jeopardize the welfare advantage of RJVs.
Given that RJVs lead to collusion in the product market, Faulí-Oller et al. (2012)
use a rich and general setting to show that a consumer-surplus maximizing antitrust
3Duso et al. (2011) use a similar approach to assess the e¤ectiveness of European merger
control.
4Amir (2000) thoroughly compares the models in dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and
Kamien et al. (2000) concluding that the real tests for their appropriateness would ultimately
have to be empirical, although the Kamien et al. (2000) model seems a priori more appropriate
for universal use. However, collusion in the product market has the same negative e¤ect in both
models. For the purposes of our analysis, the choice of a specic model is therefore not essential
because our focus is on the e¤ect of collusion in both domestic and international RJVs.
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1.1. INTRODUCTION
authority should almost always prohibit RJVs.5 Using a di¤erent approach, some
papers have analyzed RJVs in an international context without collusion. Spencer
and Brander (1983) consider government intervention through subsidies and taxes on
exports and R&D, and conclude that countries do not subsidize R&D when export
subsidies are available. Neary and OSullivan (1999) analyze the e¤ect of export
subsidies in a model where domestic and foreign rms choose R&D either indepen-
dently or cooperatively and compete in the product market. These subsidies produce
di¤erent welfare e¤ects depending on the existence of a government commitment to
support export subsidies.
We analyze the e¤ect of RJVs on consumer welfare in an international context
when rms can collude. RJVs can be used as a subterfuge to sustain tacit collusion
agreements in the product market, and the e¤ect of collusion may di¤er between do-
mestic and international agreements. Our analysis is based on a model that extends
the study of dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) to a context with international
trade. There are two countries with four rms - two in each country. We assume the
technological spillovers between domestic and foreign rms to be di¤erent. Strate-
gic decision making by rms is modeled as a two-stage game. In stage one, rms
decide whether or not to form a RJV with another rm, either domestic or foreign.
In stage two, rms choose the quantity to produce. Once a RJV has been formed,
it is possible to distinguish two scenarios. Either rms decide on production levels
non-cooperatively, or they use the RJV to collude in the production stage. We limit
our attention to symmetric outcomes where either two domestic or two international
RJVs are formed, along with the base case in which no RJV is formed. In addition
to the base case, we thus have four di¤erent scenarios: (i) domestic and (ii) interna-
tional RJVs with no collusion in the production stage, and (iii) domestic and (iv)
international RJVs with collusion in the production stage.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. In the absence of collusion, both
domestic and international RJVs are consumer welfare-enhancing when the spillovers
are su¢ ciently large. The relative magnitude of each spillover e¤ect (domestic and
international) determines which of the two types of RJV is more benecial. In the
5Other papers have focused on the e¤ect of RJVs in the presence of cost asymmetries (Petit
and Tolwinski, 1999), product di¤erentiation (Rosenkranz, 1995, and Lambertini et al., 2002),
asymmetric spillovers (Amir and Wooders, 1999), and technology di¤erentiation (Gil-Molto et al.,
2005).
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1.2. THE MODEL
presence of collusion, domestic RJVs are unambiguously welfare-reducing whereas
international RJVs can be welfare-enhancing. While collusion in domestic RJVs
yields a competition-reduction e¤ect, under international RJVs there is an additional
e¢ ciency-gains e¤ect since the specialization in domestic markets allows partner
rms to save internationalization costs. International RJVs therefore increase con-
sumer welfare when the latter positive e¤ect of collusion predominates over the former
negative e¤ect. Naturally, when internationalization costs are low, collusion typically
reduces consumer welfare (for both domestic and international RJVs).
In general, RJVs with collusion harm consumers. However, our results introduce a
qualication to this statement: international RJVs with collusion might be benecial
for consumers when internationalization costs are high. The EU and US competition
policy advises against RJVs that facilitate collusion on the grounds of their expected
negative e¤ects. Our results suggest that antitrust authorities should distinguish
between domestic and international RJVs and, in certain cases, be more benevolent
with international RJVs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the equilib-
rium (both in production and R&D) in the base case where no RJVs are observed.
Section 3 analyzes domestic and international RJVs in the absence of collusion at the
production stage. Section 4 assesses the e¤ect of collusion. Finally, a brief concluding
section closes the paper. All the proofs can be consulted in the Appendix.
1.2 The Model
Consider an industry with four rms located in two countries that produce a ho-
mogeneous good. Two rms are located in country A and two rms are located in
country B. Each rm i decides on the quantity to produce for the domestic market
(hij) and for the foreign market (eij), with i = 1; 2 and j = A;B. Thus, the total
quantity traded in country j consists of domestic production and imports, i.e.,
qj = hj + el = h1j + h2j + e1l + e2l, (1.2.1)
where j; l = A;B and j 6= l. Firms face a linear inverse demand function pj = a  qj
and compete in quantities (à la Cournot).
6
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1.2. THE MODEL
Production costs are assumed to be linear in the rms total output. Firms can
reduce their marginal production costs by undertaking R&D activities, xij, at cost
x2ij=2 with     9:6.6 R&D e¤orts exerted by an individual rm produce a
positive spillover that benets other rms. These spillovers may have an asymmetric
impact on the domestic and the foreign markets. Let us denote by  and  the
intensity of spillovers at the domestic and international levels, respectively. Thus,
total production cost for rm i in country j is given by
CTij =
"
c  xij   xkj   
X
i=1;2
xil
#
(hij + eij) + x
2
ij=2, (1.2.2)
where i; k = 1; 2 with i 6= k and a > c > 0. At this point, it seems sensible to
assume 0 6  6   (1  ) =2 so that the own marginal return to R&D e¤ort
is larger than the absorbed one. This cost structure builds on the one proposed in
dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988), adapting it to a framework with international
trade.7
In addition, selling abroad makes rms incur an additional internationalization
cost, teij. This term accounts for learning costs on how to adapt the product to
a foreign market, the costs for complying with di¤erent legal requirements, higher
transportation costs, or the payment of tari¤s levied by the foreign country.8 Thus,
the prots of a rm i located in country j are given by
ij = pjhij + pleij   CTij   teij. (1.2.3)
Now, consider the base case in which rms behave non-cooperatively in both
stages of the game, i.e., rms neither engage in RJVs nor collude in production. In
stage 2, rms choose quantities hij and eij to maximize prots in Eq. (1.2.3). The
6This threshold ensures compliance with second-order and stability conditions. These conditions
are thoroughly analyzed in the Appendix 1:6.
7Kamien and Zang (2000) extend the dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) model to allow for
absorptive capacity. In their model, the extent to which a rm can benet from R&D carried on by
other rms depends on its own R&D investment. As compared to the case with costless spillovers,
they nd that absorptive capacity yields larger R&D spending. Introducing absorptive capacity in
our analysis would not change the results qualitatively while complicating the model substantially.
8In this paper we assume internationalization costs to be entirely exogenous. Though, as pointed
out by an anonymous referee, some of these costs could be endogenous such as some tari¤s and
other articial trade barriers.
7
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1.2. THE MODEL
Cournot-Nash equilibrium values of this stage game (conditional on R&D decisions)
are
h02ij =
1
5
"
a  c+ 2t  (1 +    3)
X
i=1;2;j=A;B
xij
#
+ (1  ) xij + (1  ) xkj
(1.2.4)
and
e02ij =
1
5
"
a  c  3t  (1 +    3)
X
i=1;2;j=A;B
xij
#
+ (1  ) xij + (1  ) xkj,
(1.2.5)
where the superscript 02 denotes stage-2 equilibrium values in the base case. The
sole di¤erence between home and foreign production quantities is found in the e¤ect
of the internationalization cost, which benets domestic production. By looking
at these expressions along with Eq. (1.2.1), we can verify that the existence of
internationalization costs reduces total production in both countries. We can also
conrm that both h02ij and e
02
ij increase with xij, which constitutes a natural rm
reaction to a lower marginal production cost.
Plugging these values into Eq. (1.2.3), we obtain the stage-1 prot function that
rms maximize through their choices of R&D
ij =
 
h02ij
2
+
 
e02ij
2   x2ij=2. (1.2.6)
The SPNE total quantity is given by
q0j = 10
2 (a  c)  t
25 (   1) + (2 + 4  3)2 , (1.2.7)
where the superscript 0 denotes equilibrium values in the base case. These expres-
sions corroborate the ine¢ ciency associated to the presence of internationalization
costs. At this point, we need to impose an upper bound to the marginal inter-
nationalization cost to ensure non-negative equilibrium values, which is given by
0 6 t 6 t  2(a  c).
We compare consumer surplus under all the scenarios considered, since competi-
tion and antitrust authorities use this criterion to assess the welfare e¤ects of RJVs,
8
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STAGE
mergers, and other agreements among rms.9 With linear demand functions, this is
tantamount to comparing quantities. As pointed out by dAspremont and Jacquemin
(1988), the comparison of R&D e¤orts could yield a di¤erent ordering than compar-
ison of quantities. However, our analysis focuses exclusively on the comparison of
quantities (and not R&D spending) because competition and antitrust authorities
do not take into account the potential (but uncertain) future gains of di¤erent R&D
e¤orts when assessing possible anticompetitive practices.10
1.3 RJVs without Collusion at the Production
Stage
DAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) conclude that (domestic) RJVs without col-
lusion at the production stage are socially protable for su¢ ciently large spillover
levels. In this section, we test this result in a more general context of international
competition where both domestic and international RJVs are possible and can have
di¤erent spillover e¤ects. As mentioned above, research spillovers (synergies, risk
sharing, e¢ ciency gains, innovation di¤usion, etc.) constitute the main argument for
antitrust authorities when assessing RJVs. However, these authorities apparently do
not distinguish between domestic and international RJVs, even though the spillovers
they generate may be substantially di¤erent.
Having explained the base case, our attention now shifts to RJV formation, at
both the domestic and international levels. In this section, we assume that rms
collaboration on R&D activities does not extend to the realm of production. Since
9In this paper, we do not include an equilibrium analysis to assess eventual conicts between
private and public interests. The reason is that, as pointed out by an anonymous referee, RJVs
are also motivated by xed-costs savings. Naturally, including xed costs in the analysis would
benet RJV formation. Therefore, any equilibrium analysis would strongly depend on the size of
these xed costs. By contrast, consumer welfare is independent of xed costs. However, we have
performed an equilibrium analysis for the case where there are no xed costs, which is the least
favorable case for RJV formation. This analysis can be found in the Complementary Appendix 1:7.
10As pointed out in Banal-Estañol et al. (2008), this is consistent with the current standards
used both in the US and the EU to assess mergers. In the US, the substantial lessening of com-
petitiontest (SLC) has been interpreted such that a merger is unlawful if it is likely that it will
lead to an increase in price (i.e., to a decrease in consumer surplus). In the EU, the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines state that the Commission should take into account, above all, the interests of
consumers when considering e¢ ciency claims of merging rms (art. 79-81). Subsequent papers,
such as Duso et al. (2014), have also used this criterion.
9
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partner rms behave non-cooperatively when choosing their optimal production lev-
els, stage-2 equilibrium values remain the same as in the base case. However, in stage
1, partner rms determine their R&D e¤orts jointly.
Therefore, in the case of a domestic RJV, partner rms solve
max
x1j ;x2j
X
i=1;2
ij =
X
i=1;2
h 
h02ij
2
+
 
e02ij
2   x2ij=2i , (1.3.1)
and in the case of an international RJV, partner rms solve
max
xiA;xiB
X
j=A;B
ij =
X
j=A;B
h 
h02ij
2
+
 
e02ij
2   x2ij=2i . (1.3.2)
Since the main goal of this paper is to understand the welfare implications of
RJVs, in the analysis that follows we will directly present the equilibrium total
quantities,11 which are
qDj = 10
2 (a  c)  t
25   12  4 [2(3 + ) +  (1 + 2) (3  4)] (1.3.3)
and
qIj = 10
2 (a  c)  t
25   12  4 [1 + 7   (1 + 2) (2  )] , (1.3.4)
where the superscriptsD and I, respectively, denote equilibrium values in the domes-
tic and international RJV cases in the absence of collusion. The di¤erence between
the two expressions lies in the value of the denominator, which depends on the in-
tensity of domestic and international spillovers (i.e.,  and ).
Based on a pairwise comparison of equilibrium quantities under domestic and in-
ternational RJVs along with the base case where no RJVs are formed, i.e., comparing
Eqs. (1.2.7), (1.3.3), and (1.3.4), the following proposition arises.
Proposition 1 Let  6 , 0 6  6 , and 0 6 t 6 t. When partner rms in a RJV
do not collude, consumer welfare is maximized
i) under international RJVs if  is su¢ ciently high,
ii) under domestic RJVs if  is low and  is su¢ ciently high,
iii) when no RJVs are formed, otherwise.
11More information on the computations is available from the authors on request.
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STAGE
Naturally, each type of RJV requires a minimum level of spilloversintensity to
yield an overall positive e¤ect. The results in Proposition 1 are represented in Fig.
1:1 below.
Fig.1:1. Socially preferred RJVs without collusion.
Proposition 1(ii) conrms the result reported by dAspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) which points out that (domestic) RJVs are socially preferred when (domestic)
spillovers are large enough (which corresponds to moving to the east in Fig. 1:1).
Similarly, we nd that the international RJVs are consumer welfare-enhancing when
international spillovers are su¢ ciently high (which corresponds to moving to the
north-east in Fig. 1:1). Moreover, a necessary condition for international RJVs to be
more protable than the domestic RJVs requires international spillovers to be larger
than domestic ones ( > 1 in Fig. 1:1). The policy implications of these ndings
are that each type of RJVs should be allowed when the corresponding spillovers are
su¢ ciently large.12
12The comparison between the consumer welfare and the equilibrium analyses yields the following
result (details can be found in the Complementary Appendix 1:7). We observe that (i) in Region II,
international RJVs maximize the consumer welfare but rms prefer domestic RJVs, (ii) in Region I,
11
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1.4 RJVs with Collusion at the Production Stage
As mentioned in the introduction, RJVs can be employed to facilitate collusion in the
product market. Of course, this means that the potential positive e¤ect of RJVs on
consumer welfare is more questionable. In this section, we analyze the consequences
of domestic and international RJVs when they involve collusive behavior.13 In this
case, we assume that partner rms share the market 50/50, so that the RJV behaves
as a merger of equals.14
In the case of a domestic RJV, stage-2 production levels are therefore determined
by solving
max
hij ;eij
X
i=1;2
ij =
X
i=1;2
[pjhij + pleij   CTij   teij] , (1.4.1)
where hij = hj=2 and eij = ej=2. In the case of an international RJV, a straight-
forward e¢ ciency argument suggests that partner rms specialize in their respective
domestic markets and avoid exporting to save internationalization costs. As a con-
sequence, eij = 0 and stage-2 production levels are determined by solving
max
hij
X
j=A;B
ij =
X
j=A;B
[pjhij   CTij] . (1.4.2)
Having obtained the results for production, partner rms jointly determine their
R&D e¤orts in stage 1, which yields
qDCj = 3
2 (a  c)  t
9   4  4 [2 + +  (1 + 2) (1  )] (1.4.3)
no RJV maximizes the consumer welfare but rms prefer RJVs (international RJVs for   1 and
domestic RJVs for   1) and, (iii) in Region III, domestic RJVs maximize the consumer welfare
but rms prefer international RJVs. The reason for these conicts to arise is the following. When
domestic (international) RJVs are socially desirable, rms prefer international (domestic) RJVs
because rms use RJVs as a device to internalize the externalities stemming from other rms
R&D. Therefore, when domestic (international) spillovers are large, domestic (international) RJVs
are not observed in equilibrium because rms already benet from the other rmsR&D.
13In a di¤erent setting, Martin (1995) studies the impact of RJVs on the stability of product-
market collusion.
14It could be argued that concentrating all the production in a single rm could be more e¢ cient.
However, capacity constrains and the tacit nature of the collusion agreement between symmetric
rms argue in favor of the 50/50 assumption.
12
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
INNOVATION, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND COOPERATIVE R&D STRATEGIES 
Guiomar Ibáñez Zárate 
 
 
1.4. RJVS WITH COLLUSION AT THE PRODUCTION STAGE
and
qICj = h
IC
j = 6
(a  c)
9   4  2 [1 + 5   (1 + 2) (1  )] , (1.4.4)
where the superscripts DC and IC denote equilibrium values under domestic and
international RJV in the presence of collusion, respectively.15 As in the case without
collusion, these equilibrium expressions di¤er in the intensity of the domestic and
international spillovers that a¤ect the denominator of the expressions. Additionally,
collusive international RJVs also benet from being exempt from internationalization
costs. Consequently, t does not appear in Eq. (1.4.4). From a pairwise comparison
of Eqs. (1.2.7), (1.4.3), and (1.4.4), the following proposition arises.
Proposition 2 Let  6 , 0 6  6 , and 0 6 t 6 t. When partner rms in a RJV
collude, consumer welfare is maximized
i) under international RJVs if t=(a  c) and  are high,
ii) when no RJVs are formed if t=(a  c) and  are low.
Domestic RJVs never maximize consumer welfare.
Fig. 1:2. Socially preferred RJVs with collusion.
15More information on the computations is available from the authors on request.
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Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, we nd that collusion has a di¤erentiated ef-
fect on consumer welfare under domestic and international RJVs. First, collusion
reduces consumer welfare under domestic RJVs. This competition-reduction e¤ect of
collusion under RJVs has also been obtained by dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
and Martin (1995) in related models. Thus, Region III in Fig. 1:1 does not appear
in Fig. 1:2. Second, under international RJVs, an additional e¤ect of collusion is
that it allows partner rms to save internationalization costs since they specialize
in domestic markets and do not export (i.e., eij = 0 and qICj = h
IC
j ).
16 The higher
the internationalization cost, the grater this e¢ ciency-gains e¤ect of collusion. As a
consequence, region IIin Fig. 1:2 expands (shrinks) as t increases (decreases) and
may become larger (smaller) than region II in Fig 1:1. When t is very low, region
IIdisappears from Fig. 1:2 and, thus, international RJVs are never the best option
in terms of consumer welfare. Similarly, for a su¢ ciently high t, international RJVs
maximize consumer welfare even in the absence of spillovers. As a consequence,
spillovers are needed to make international RJVs consumer welfare-enhancing for
moderate values of t.17
1.5 Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
The results in this paper can be generalized in di¤erent directions. Considering
heterogeneous products, the social protability of international RJVs in the presence
of collusion would be somewhat diluted. This is because the domestic specialization
associated to collusion under international RJVs would also entail a loss of product
16As a result, rms only absorb spillovers through their domestic production (see Eq. (1.2.2)).
17The equilibrium analysis yields the following result: a multiple equilibrium of the type {(Form,
Form)I , (No Form, No Form)} appears in Region IIand in the western part of Region I; and the
unique equilibrium in the eastern part of Region I is (Form, Form)I (details in the Complementary
Appendix: Equilibrium Analysis). From the comparison between the consumer welfare and the
equilibrium analyses, we observe that (i) in Region II, there is no privatepublic conict when the
equilibrium is of the type (Form, Form)I but there is a conict when the equilibrium is (No form,
No form) because consumer welfare is maximized under international RJVs, (ii) in the western part
of Region I, there is no privatepublic conict when the equilibrium is of the type (No Form, No
Form) but there is a conict when the equilibrium is (Form, Form)I because consumer welfare is
maximized in the absence of RJVs, and (iii) in the eastern part of Region I, there is a conict
because no RJVs maximize consumer welfare but rms prefer international RJVs. In conclusion,
while both consumers and rms dislike domestic RJVs, international RJV formation is always an
equilibrium because they are formed as a device to save internationalization costs.
14
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1.5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
variety for consumers. Another generalization of the paper would is the extension to
di¤erent competitive environments: enlarging the number of rms would downplay
the negative e¤ect of collusion, whereas assuming price competition would exacerbate
it.
The policy implications of this paper are as follows. In industries characterized by
a low probability of collusion, RJVs (both domestic and international) should be al-
lowed when the spillovers are large enough.18 This recommendation is consistent with
the ndings in dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988). However, in industries where
RJVs are likely to be used as a subterfuge to sustain a tacit collusion agreement,
domestic RJVs should always be forbidden, regardless of the intensity of spillovers.
By contrast, international RJVs should be allowed in high-spillover environments as
long as the e¢ ciency gains stemming from savings on internationalization costs are
large enough. This means that international RJVs should be treated more favorably
than domestic RJVs under these circumstances.
18Industries are characterized by a low probability of collusion when rms do not interact re-
peatedly, there is a large number of participants, or there are low barriers to entry. In addition,
collusion is more di¢ cult in declining markets (Ivaldi et al., 2007); and in advertising-intensive and
low capital-intensive industries (Symeonidis, 2003).
15
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1.6. APPENDIX
1.6 Appendix
In this appendix, we elucidate the conditions that ensure positive quantities and
compliance with second-order and stability conditions in all the scenarios considered,
i.e., we prove the following claim.
Claim 1 Imposing  >  = 9:6 is su¢ cient to ensure compliance with second-order
and stability conditions.
1.6.1 Second-order conditions
 Base case (no RJVs)
It can be veried that second-order conditions at the production stage (stage 1) are
always satised. At the R&D stage (stage 2), from @2ij=@x2ij < 0 (see Eq. (1.2.6))
we obtain
 > 1 
4
25
[4   (1 + 2)]2 . (1.6.1)
A su¢ cient condition for Eq. (1.6.1) to be true, is that  > max
066
1  1 =
4
25
(4  )2.
 Domestic RJVs without collusion at the production stage
It can be conrmed that second-order conditions at the production stage (stage 1)
are always satised. At the R&D stage (stage 2), from @2 (1j + 2j) =@x21j < 0 and
@2 (1j + 2j) =@x
2
2j < 0 (see Eq. (8)) we obtain
 > 2 
4
25

17 + 
 
17   16  12 (1 + ) + 82 , (1.6.2)
and positivity of the determinant requires (2   )2 
8
25
[1 + 2 (  2)] [ (1 + 2)  4]	2 > 0, which is observed when
 > 3  max

4 (   1)2 ; 4
25
[ (4  3)  3]2

. (1.6.3)
A su¢ cient condition for Eqs. (1.6.2) and (1.6.3) to be true, is that  > max
066
2 
2 =
4
25
 
172   16 + 17 and  > max
066
3  3 = maxf4 (   1)2 ; 3625 ( + 1)2g,
16
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respectively.
 International RJVs without collusion at the production stage
It can be veried that second-order conditions at the production stage (stage 1) are
always satised. At the R&D stage (stage 2), from @2 (iA + iB) =@x2iA < 0 and
@2 (iA + iB) =@x
2
iB < 0 (see Eq. (1.3.2)) we obtain
 > 4 
4
25
f17 +  [ (2 +  (13  2))  22  6]g , (1.6.4)
and positivity of the determinant requires
(4   )2  

8
25
[1   (3  1)] [ (1 + 2)  4]	2 > 0, which is observed when
 > 5  max

4 (   1)2 ; 4
25
[ (  2) + 3]2

. (1.6.5)
A su¢ cient condition for Eqs. (1.6.4) and (1.6.5) to be true, is that  > max
066
4 
4 =
4
25
 
22   6 + 17 and  > max
066
5  5 = max

4; 1
25
(7  5)2	 = 4, respec-
tively.
 Domestic RJVs with collusion at the production stage
It can be conrmed that second-order conditions at the production stage (stage 1)
are always satised. At the R&D stage (stage 2), from @2 (1j + 2j) =@x21j < 0 and
@2 (1j + 2j) =@x
2
2j < 0 we obtain
 > 6 
4
9
[ (  1)  1]2 , (1.6.6)
and positivity of the determinant requires (6   )2 26 > 0, which is observed when
 > 7  26. (1.6.7)
A su¢ cient condition for Eqs. (1.6.6) and (1.6.7) to be true, is that  > max
066
6 
6  49 ( + 1)2 and  > max
066
7  7 = 26 , respectively.
 International RJVs with collusion at the production stage
17
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It can be veried that second-order conditions at the production stage (stage 1) are
always satised. At the R&D stage (stage 2), from @2 (iA + iB) =@x2iA < 0 and
@2 (iA + iB) =@x
2
iB < 0 we obtain
 > 8 
1
9

8 + 2


 
1 + 2
  4	 , (1.6.8)
and positivity of the determinant requires (8   )2  

4
9
 (2  )2 > 0, which is
observed when
 > 9 
2
9
[ (  1) + 2]2 . (1.6.9)
A su¢ cient condition for Eqs. (1.6.8) and (1.6.9) to be true, is that  > max
066
8 
8  118
 
52   18 + 17 and  > max
066
9  9  118 (5  3)2, respectively.
As a result of comparing the previous second-order conditions and using the bounds
h for h = 1; :::; 9, we compute the lower bound for  as:
19
 > max
01
f1 ; :::; 9g = max
01
f4; 36
25
( + 1)2g = 5:76. 
1.6.2 Stability conditions
Stability of equilibria is ensured when the Jacobian of rst derivatives of prots with
respect to R&D investments is negative denite (for further details, see chapter 2 in
Vives (2001)). This matrix is symmetric with the following structure0BBBB@
A B C D
B A D C
C D A B
D C B A
1CCCCA .
19It can be veried that 1 < 

5 , 

2 < 

5 , 

4 < 

5 , 

6 < 

7 < 

5 , and 

8 < 

9 < 

5 . In
addition, the rst bound in 3 is also lower than 

5 , i.e., 4 (   1)2 < 4.
18
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The Jacobian of rst derivatives is negative denite if
A < 0, (1.6.10)
(A B)(A+B) > 0, (1.6.11)
2BCD + A
 
A2  B2   C2  D2 < 0, (1.6.12)
(A+B)2   (C +D)2 (A B)2   (C  D)2 > 0. (1.6.13)
The condition in Eq. (1.6.10) is already guaranteed by second-order conditions.
Claim 2 Conditions in Eqs. (1.6.11)-(1.6.13) are satised i¤
A B < 0, (1.6.14)
A+B < 0, (1.6.15)
(A+B)2   (C +D)2 > 0, (1.6.16)
(A B)2   (C  D)2 > 0. (1.6.17)
Proof. First, note that Eqs. (1.6.14) and (1.6.15) guarantee that Eq. (1.6.11)
holds and Eqs. (1.6.16) and (1.6.17) guarantee that Eq. (1.6.13) holds. Finally, Eq.
(1.6.12) can be rewritten as:
(A B)2  2A (A+B)  (C +D)2 > (C  D)2 (A B) (A+B) . (1.6.18)
Under Eq. (1.6.17), Eq. (1.6.18) holds i¤
2A (A+B)  (C +D)2 > (A B) (A+B) , or (1.6.19)
(A+B)2   (C +D)2 > 0, (1.6.20)
which is Eq. (1.6.16).
 Base case (no RJVs)
19
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In this scenario
A  @2ij=@x2ij =
1
25
f64  25 + 4 [1 + 2] [ 8 +  (1 + 2)]g ,
B  @2ij=@xij@xkj = 4
25
[1  2 (2  )] [ 4 +  (1 + 2)] , and
C = D  @2ij=@xij@xil = 4
25
[ 4 +  (1 + 2)] [1 +  (1  3)] .
Thus, Eq. (1.6.17) holds directly and Eqs. (1.6.14)-(1.6.16) become
 > 10 
4
5
(1  ) [4   (1 + 2)] , (1.6.21)
 > 11 
4
25
[4   (1 + 2)] [3 +  (3  4)] , (1.6.22)
 > 12  max

4
5
[4   (1 + 2)] (1 +    2) ;
4
25
[4   (1 + 2)] (1 +  + 2)

. (1.6.23)
A su¢ cient condition for Eqs. (1.6.21)-(1.6.23) to be true is that  > max
066
10 
10  45 (4  ) (1  ),  > max
066
11  11 = 1225 (4  ) (1 + ), and  > max
066
12 
12 = max

4
5
(4  ) (1 + ) ; 24
25
	
= 4
5
(4  ) (1 + ), respectively.
20
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 Domestic RJVs without collusion at the production stage
In this scenario
A  @2 (1j + 2j) =@x2ij =
1
25

68  25 + 4  16 + 17   12 (1 + ) + 82	 ,
B  @2 (1j + 2j) =@x1j@x2j = 8
25
[1  2 (2  )] [ 4 +  (1 + 2)] , and
C = D  @2 (1j + 2j) =@x1j@xil = 4
25
[ 3 +  ( 3 + 4)] [1 +  (1  3)] ,
for i = 1; 2 and j; l = A;B. Thus, Eq. (1.6.17) holds directly and Eqs. (1.6.14)-
(1.6.16) become
 > 13  4 (1  )2 , (1.6.24)
 > 14 
4
25
[3 +  (3  4)]2 , (1.6.25)
 > 15  max

4
5
[3 +  (3  4)] (1 +    2) ;
4
25
[3 +  (3  4)] (1 +  + 2)

. (1.6.26)
A su¢ cient condition for Eqs. (1.6.24)-(1.6.26) to be true is that  > max
066
13 
13  4 (1  )2,  > max
066
14  14 = 3625 (1 + )2, and  > max
066
15  15 =
max

12
5
(1 + )2 ; 1
2
(1 + )2
	
= 12
5
(1 + )2, respectively.
 International RJVs without collusion at the production stage
In this scenario
A  @2 (iA + iB) =@x2ij =
1
25
f68  25 + 4 [ 6  22+  (2 +  [13  2])]g ,
B  @2 (iA + iB) =@xiA@xiB = 8
25
[1 +  (1  3)] [ 4 +  (1 + 2)] ,
C  @2 (iA + iB) =@xij@xkj = 4
25
 3 +   19  3   12 (1 + ) + 132 , and
D  @2 (iA + iB) =@xij@xkl = 4
25
[1 +  (1  3)] [ 3   (3  4)] ,
21
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for i; k = 1; 2, k 6= i and j; l = A;B, l 6= j. Thus, Eqs. (1.6.14)-(1.6.17) become
 > 16  4 (1  )2 , (1.6.27)
 > 17 
4
25
[3   (2  )]2 , (1.6.28)
 > 18  max

4
5
(1  ) [3   (2  )] ; 4
25
[3   (2  )] [1 +  (1 + 2)]

,
(1.6.29)
 > 19  max f4 (1  ) (1  ) ; 4 (1  ) [1 +  (1  2)]g . (1.6.30)
A su¢ cient condition for Eqs. (1.6.27)-(1.6.30) to be true is that  > max
066
16 
16  4,  > max
066
17  17 = 125 (7  5)2,  > max
066
18  18 =
max

2
5
(7  5) (1  ) ; 4
25
(7  5)	,
and  > max
066
19  19 = max f4 (1  ) ; 4 (1 + )g = 4 (1 + ), respectively.
 Domestic RJVs with collusion at the production stage
In this scenario
A  @2 (1j + 2j) =@x2ij =
1
9
f4  9 + 4 [2 +  (1  )] [1  ]g ,
B  @2 (1j + 2j) =@x1j@x2j = 4
9
[1 +  (1  )]2 , and
C = D  @2 (1j + 2j) =@x1j@xil = 2
9
[1 +  (1  )] [ 1 +  ( 1 + 4)] ,
for i = 1; 2 and j; l = A;B. Thus, Eq. (1.6.17) holds directly and Eqs. (1.6.14)-
(1.6.16) become
 > 0, (1.6.31)
 > 20 
8
9
[1 +  (1  )]2 , (1.6.32)
 > 21  max

4
9
[1 +  (1  )] [1 +  (1 + 2)] ;
4
3
[1 +  (1  )] [1 +  (1  2)]

. (1.6.33)
Eq. (1.6.31) holds by construction. A su¢ cient condition for Eqs. (1.6.32) and
(1.6.33) to be true is that  > max
066
20  20  89 (1 + )2 and  > max
066
21 
22
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21 = max

1
2
(1 + )2 ; 4
3
(1 + )2
	
= 4
3
(1 + )2, respectively.
 International RJVs with collusion at the production stage
In this scenario
A  @2 (iA + iB) =@x2ij =
1
9

8  9   2 4    1 + 2	 ,
B  @2 (iA + iB) =@xiA@xiB = 4
9
 (2  ) ,
C  @2 (iA + iB) =@xij@xkj = 2
9
 2 +  5 +    2 + 2	 , and
D  @2 (iA + iB) =@xij@xkl = 2
9
 (1 + ) ,
for i; k = 1; 2, k 6= i and j; l = A;B, l 6= j. Thus, Eqs. (1.6.14)-(1.6.17) become
 > 22 
2
9
[2   (1 + )]2 , (1.6.34)
 > 23 
2
9
[2   (1  )]2 , (1.6.35)
 > 24  max

2
3
(1  ) [2   (1  )] ; 2
9
[2   (1  )] [1 +  (1 + 2)]

,
(1.6.36)
 > 25  max

2
3
(1  ) [2   (1 + )] ; 2
9
[2   (1 + )] [1 +  (1  2)]

.
(1.6.37)
A su¢ cient condition for Eqs. (1.6.34)-(1.6.37) to be true is that  > max
066
22 
22  29 (2  )2,  > max
066
23  23 = 118 (5  3)2,  > max
066
24  24 =
max

1
3
(5  3) (1  ) ; 2
9
(5  3)	, and
 > max
066
25  25 = max

2
3
(1  ) (2  ) ; 2
9
(1 + ) (2  )	, respectively.
As a result of comparing the previous stability conditions and using the bounds h
for h = 10; :::; 25, we compute the lower bound for  as:20
 >   max
01
f10; :::; 25g = 9:6. 
20It can be conrmed that 10 < 

12, 

11 < 

12 < 4:8, 

13 < 4, 

14 < 

15 < 9:6, 

16 < 

19,
17 < 1:96, 

18 < 5:6, 

19 < 8, 

20 < 

21 < 16=3, 

22 < 8=9, 

23 < 25=15, 

24 < 2, and 

25 < 4=3.
23
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1.6.3 Proof of Proposition 1
From q0j   qIj = 0 we obtain 1 = 13 (1 + ), which is plotted in Fig. 1:1. Then
q0j > qIj for  6 1 (regions I and III in Fig. 1:1) and q0j > qIj for  > 1 (region II
in Fig. 1:1).
From q0j   qDj = 0 we obtain 2 = 12 (4   1), which is plotted in Fig. 1:1. Then
q0j > q
D
j for  > 

2 (regions I and II in Fig. 1:1) and q
0
j 6 qDj for  6 2 (region III
in Fig. 1:1).
From qDj   qIj = 0 we obtain  = 1. Then qDj > qIj for  6 1 and qDj < qIj for  > 1.
As a consequence, q0j > q
I
j and q
0
j > q
D
j in region I; q
I
j > q
0
j > q
D
j (since  > 1) in
region II; and qDj > q
0
j > q
I
j (since  < 1) in region III.
In the base case, maximization of the stage-1 prot function (i.e., Eq. (3)) yields the
following SPNE values
x0ij =
2 (4     2) (2 (a  c)  t)
25 + 2 ( + 2  4) (2 + 4+ 2) , (1.6.38)
h0ij =
5
2

2 (a  c)  t
25 + 4 ( + 2  4) ( + 2+ 1) +
t
2
, (1.6.39)
e0ij =
5
2

2 (a  c)  t
25 + 4 ( + 2  4) ( + 2+ 1)  
t
2
, (1.6.40)
q0j = 10
2 (a  c)  t
25 (   1) + (2 + 4  3)2 , (1.6.41)
0ij =
( 
252
2
   (2 (4     2))
2
2
!

2 (a  c)  t
25 + 4 ( + 2  4) ( + 2+ 1)
2
+
t2
2
)
. (1.6.42)
In the case of a domestic RJV, maximization of the stage-1 prot function (i.e., Eq.
24
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(8)) yields the following SPNE values
xDij =
2 (3   4+ 3) (2 (a  c)  t)
25   2 (2 + 4+ 2) (3   4+ 3) , (1.6.43)
hDij =
5
2

2a  2c  t
25   2 (2 + 4+ 2) (3   4+ 3) +
t
2
, (1.6.44)
eDij =
5
2

2a  2c  t
25   2 (2 + 4+ 2) (3   4+ 3)  
t
2
, (1.6.45)
qDj = 10
2 (a  c)  t
25   12  4 (2(3 + ) +  (1 + 2) (3  4)) , (1.6.46)
Dij =
 
252
2
   (2 (3   4+ 3))
2
2
!
2 (a  c)  t
25   2 (2 + 4+ 2) (3   4+ 3)
2
::+
t2
2
. (1.6.47)
In the case of an international RJV, maximization of the stage-1 prot function (i.e.,
Eq. (9)) yields the following SPNE values
xIij =
2 (3  2 + ) (2 (a  c)  t)
25   2 (3  2 + ) (2 + 4+ 2) , (1.6.48)
hIij =
5
2

2a  2c  t
25   2 (3  2 + ) (2 + 4+ 2) +
t
2
, (1.6.49)
eIij =
5
2

2a  2c  t
25   2 (3  2 + ) (2 + 4+ 2)  
t
2
, (1.6.50)
qIj = 10
2 (a  c)  t
25   2 (3  2 + ) (2 + 4+ 2) , (1.6.51)
Iij =
 
252
2
   (2 (3  2 + ))
2
2
!
2 (a  c)  t
25   2 (3  2 + ) (2 + 4+ 2)
2
+
t2
2
. (1.6.52)
A comparison between Eqs. (1.6.38)-(1.6.42) and Eqs. (1.6.43)-(1.6.47) yields di-
rectly q0j > q
D
j , h
0
ij > h
D
ij , e
0
ij > e
D
ij , x
0
ij > x
D
ij , 
0
ij < 
D
ij for  >
4 1
2
 2; and
q0j  qDj , h0ij  hDij , e0ij  eDij , x0ij  xDij , 0ij  Dij for   2.
A comparison between Eqs. (1.6.38)-(1.6.42) and Eqs. (1.6.48)-(1.6.52) yields di-
rectly q0j > q
I
j , h
0
ij > h
I
ij, e
0
ij > e
I
ij, x
0
ij > x
I
ij, 
0
ij < 
I
ij for  <
1+
3
 1; and q0j  qIj ,
h0ij  hIij, e0ij  eIij, x0ij  xIij, 0ij  Iij for   1.
Finally, a comparison between Eqs. (1.6.43)-(1.6.47) and Eqs. (1.6.48)-(1.6.52) yields
25
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directly qDj > q
I
j , h
D
ij > h
I
ij, e
D
ij > e
I
ij, x
D
ij > x
I
ij, 
D
ij < 
I
ij for  < 1; and q
D
j  qIj ,
hDij  hIij, eDij  eIij, xDij  xIij, Dij  Iij for   1.
As a consequence, regarding the comparison of quantities in Fig. 1:1, we have
q0j > q
I
j and q
0
j > q
D
j in region I; q
I
j > q
0
j > q
D
j (since  > 1) in region II; and
qDj > q
0
j > q
I
j (since  < 1) in region III. Regarding the comparison of prots, we
have: Dij > 
I
ij > 
0
ij in region I (in Fig. 1:1) for  > 1; 
I
ij > 
D
ij > 
0
ij in region
I for  < 1; Dij > 
0
ij > 
I
ij in region II; and 
I
ij > 
0
ij > 
D
ij in region III. These
results will be used in the Complementary Appendix 1:7. 
1.6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
First, we show that q0j > q
DC
j for  >   9:6. From q0j   qDCj > 0, we get 
 () 
15 44+32 522 882+3222+8 > 0. This function has a minimum at
MIN =
11 4
8
and 
 (MIN) = 152
 
2   152. Therefore, 
 (MIN) > 0 for  > 
and thus 
 > 0 is always observed, proving the last statement in Proposition 2.
As a consequence of the previous claim, the comparison q0j   qICj determines the
outcome that maximizes consumer welfare, where both q0j > q
IC
j (region Iin Fig.
1:2) and q0j 6 qICj (region II in Fig. 1:2) can be observed. To analyze how the
aforementioned regions change with t= (a  c), let us implicitly dene the func-
tion 3 by  (; ; ; t= (a  c))  q0j (; ; ; t= (a  c))   qICj (; ; ) = 0 where
@q0j (; ; ; t= (a  c)) =@t= (a  c) < 0. Thus, 3 falls as t= (a  c) rises and the area
where q0j > q
IC
j becomes larger (i.e., region I in Fig. 1:2 expands), which proves
Proposition 2(i) and (ii). 
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1.7 Complementary Appendix: Equilibrium
Analysis
In this appendix, we perform an equilibrium analysis. The purpose of this analysis is
twofold. On the one hand, it justies the symmetric cases considered in the consumer
welfare analysis (where either two domestic or two international RJVs are formed)
since no asymmetric outcomes occur in equilibrium (i.e., where only one RJV is
formed). On the other hand, it allows us to compare private and social interests and
to derive some policy implications out of this comparison. The complexity of the
analysis requires to include some simplifying assumptions to get conclusive results.
More precisely, the exercise is performed for the parameter values considered in Fig.
1:2, i.e.,  = 10 and t
(a c) =
4
11
, to make easier the comparison between private and
social incentives. Although the analysis is not exhaustive, it is appropriate for a
moderate range of these parameter values and reveals some interesting insights. In
addition, changes in  and t a¤ect simultaneously both the private and the social
protability of RJVs.21
1.7.1 RJVs without collusion at the production stage
First, we consider two games in which two-partner RJVs can be formed. In the
domestic game, the (two) domestic rms in each of the (two) countries decide whether
or not to form a RJV. In the international game, there are two couples of international
partners that decide whether or not to form a RJV. These games can be represented
in normal form (where players, strategies, and payo¤s are displayed) in the following
way,
Domestic game
Form No form
Form (D; D) (DN ; ND)
No form (ND; DN) (0; 0)
International game
Form No form
Form (I ; I) (IN ; NI)
No form (NI ; IN) (0; 0)
21An increase in  makes R&D more costly and discourages RJVs. An increase in t makes
international RJVs with collusion more protable (both privately and socially).
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where rm-market subscripts are omitted such that D refers to Dij , etc. After
computing the equilibrium of these two games,22 we need to consider them jointly
to obtain the nal equilibrium outcome, given that domestic and international RJVs
cannot occur simultaneously in our setting.
 Domestic game
The unilateral incentive to form a domestic RJV is derived from studying the best-
reply of domestic rms given that the rms located in the other country do not form
a RJV, i.e., computing DN   0. This exercise yields three areas depending on the
sign of the di¤erence, as depicted below.
Fig. 1:A1: DN   0
The function 2 is the same as in Fig. 1:1 and b1 is another threshold value.23
22The precise values these prot expressions are complex and are available from the authors on
request.
23The precise value of b1 is complex and is available from the authors on request.
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The best-reply of domestic rms given that the rms located in the other country
form a RJV is obtained from the di¤erence D   ND and also yields three areas
depending on the sign of the di¤erence in the way displayed below.
Fig. 1:A2: D   ND
The function 2 is the same as in Fig. 1:1 and b2 is another threshold value.24
24The precise value of b2 is complex and is available from the authors on request.
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Finally, the equilibrium arises from the joint analysis of Figs. 1:A1 and 1:A2,
which is shown in the gure below.
Fig. 1:A3: Equilibrium   domestic game
without collusion.
The equilibrium always involves forming a domestic RJV, except for the central
region delimited by functions 2 and b1. More precisely, a multiple equilibrium
arises in the region comprised between b2 and b1.
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 International game
The unilateral incentive to form an international RJV is derived from studying the
best-reply of two international partners given that the other rms do not form a
RJV, i.e., computing IN   0. This exercise yields three areas depending on the
sign of the di¤erence, as depicted below.
Fig. 1:A4: IN   0
The function 1 is the same as in Fig. 1:1 and b3 is another threshold value.25
25The precise value of b3 is complex and is available from the authors on request.
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The best-reply of two international partners given that the other rms form a
RJV is obtained from the di¤erence I   NI and also yields three areas depending
on the sign of the di¤erence in the way displayed below.
Fig. 1:A5: I   NI
The function 1 is the same as in Fig. 1:1 and b4 is another threshold value.26
26The precise value of b4 is complex and is available from the authors on request.
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Finally, the equilibrium arises from the joint analysis of Figs. 1:A4 and 1:A5,
which is shown in the gure below.
Fig. 1:A6: Equilibrium   international game
without collusion.
The equilibrium always involves forming an international RJV, except for the central
region delimited by functions b3 and 1. More precisely, a multiple equilibrium arises
in the region comprised between b3 and b4.
 Conclusion
To be able to provide an accurate equilibrium prediction, we need to consider simul-
taneously the domestic and the international games, i.e., Figs. 1:A3 and 1:A6.
First, we need to compare (i) D and 0 in the region  2
b3; 1 because (Form,
Form) is the equilibrium in the domestic game whereas (No form, No form) can be the
equilibrium in the international game, and (ii) I and 0 in the region  2

2; b1
because (No form, No form) can be the equilibrium in the domestic game whereas
(Form, Form) is the equilibrium in the international game. From Complementary
Appendix, we know that D > 0 for  > 2 and that 
I > 0 for  < 1. Therefore,
in both cases (Form, Form) is the nal equilibrium.
Second, we will assume that rms will form the best RJV in cases when both the
domestic and the international can arise as an equilibrium outcome. Therefore, we
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need to compare I and D. From Complementary Appendix, we know that I > D
for  < 1.
Fig. 1:A7: Equilibrium   domestic and international game
without collusion.
Thus, in the absence of collusion, rms always engage in RJVs and the bound  7 1
determines the type of agreement. On the one hand, when international spillovers
are small (i.e.,  < 1) rms use international RJVs to internalize the externali-
ties stemming from cross-border cooperation agreements. On the other hand, when
international spillovers are large (i.e.,  > 1), rms do not need cross-border agree-
ments to benet from foreign R&D and therefore they prefer domestic agreements.
Comparing Figs. 1:1 and 1:A7, we observe that (i) in the northern region (i.e.,
above 1), international RJVs maximize consumer welfare but rms prefer domestic
RJVs, (ii) in the upper central region (i.e.,  2 (1; 1)), no RJV maximizes con-
sumer welfare but rms prefer domestic RJVs, (iii) in the lower central region (i.e.,
 2 (max : f0; 2g ; 1)), no RJV maximizes consumer welfare but rms prefer interna-
tional RJVs, and (iv) in the eastern region (i.e., on the right of 2), domestic RJVs
maximize consumer welfare but rms prefer international RJVs. Therefore, there
is an important conict between private and public incentives: although domestic
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(international) RJVs are socially desirable when domestic (international) spillovers
are large, they are not observed in equilibrium because rms already benet from
the other rmsR&D.
1.7.2 RJVs with collusion at the production stage
In this subsection, we replicate the previous analysis now in the presence of collusion
at the production stage. Players and strategies are the same as before, but prots
change due to the presence of collusion. Thus, the domestic and international games
are represented in normal form in the following way, where subscript C denotes
collusion.
Domestic game
Form No form
Form (DC ; 
D
C ) (
DN
C ; 
ND
C )
No form (NDC ; 
DN
C ) (
0
C ; 
0
C)
International game
Form No form
Form (IC ; 
I
C) (
IN
C ; 
NI
C )
No form (NIC ; 
IN
C ) (
0
C ; 
0
C)
 Domestic game
The unilateral incentive to form a domestic RJV is derived from studying the best-
reply of domestic rms given that the rms located in the other country do not form
a RJV, i.e., computing DNC   0C . This di¤erence is always negative for 0 6  6
  (1  ) =2.27
The best-reply of domestic rms given that the rms located in the other country
form a RJV is obtained from the di¤erence DC   NDC , which is also negative in our
relevant region for any combination of  and .
As a consequence, No form is a dominant strategy and the equilibrium of the domestic
game is always (No form, No form).
 International game
The unilateral incentive to form an international RJV is derived from studying the
best-reply of two international partners given that the other rms do not form a
27The precise details on the computations are available from the authors on request.
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RJV, i.e., computing INC  0C . This exercise yields two areas depending on the sign
of the di¤erence, as depicted below,
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Fig. 1:A8: INC   0C
where the function b5 is another threshold value.28
The best-reply of two international partners given that the other rms form a RJV
is obtained from the di¤erence IC   NIC , which is always positive in our relevant
region for any combination of  and .
28The precise value of b5 is complex and is available from the authors on request.
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As a consequence, the equilibrium is as shown in the gure below.
Fig. 1:A9: Equilibrium   international game with
collusion.
The equilibrium always involves forming an international RJV, but (No form, No
form) is also an equilibrium in the western region of Fig. 1:A9.
 Conclusion
The simultaneous consideration of the domestic and the international games is straight-
forward given that No form is a dominant strategy in the domestic game. Thus, the
equilibrium is plotted in Fig. 1:A10 below, where 3 (which appears in Fig. 1:2) has
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been included to better compare rms and consumersinterests.
Fig. 1:A10: Equilibrium   domestic and international game with
collusion.
Thus, in the presence of collusion, rms never engage in domestic RJVs and may
always engage in international RJVs, although staying alone may also be an equilib-
rium for su¢ ciently low values of . Comparing Figs. 1:2 and A10, we observe that
(i) in the northern region (i.e., above 3), there is no private-public conict when the
equilibrium is of the type (Form, Form)INTERNATIONAL but there is a conict when
the equilibrium is (No form, No form) because consumer welfare is maximized under
international RJVs, (ii) in the central region (below 3 and on the left of b5), there
is no private-public conict when the equilibrium is of the type (No Form, No Form)
but there is a conict when the equilibrium is (Form, Form)INTERNATIONAL because
consumer welfare is maximized in the absence of RJVs, and (iii) in the eastern re-
gion (i.e., on the right of b5), there is again a conict because no RJVs maximize
consumer welfare but rms prefer international RJVs. In conclusion, while both con-
sumers and rms dislike domestic RJVs, international RJV formation is always an
equilibrium because they are formed as a device to save internationalization costs.

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Chapter 2
Innovation and Horizontal Mergers
in a Vertically Related Industry
I gratefully acknowledge Ricardo Flores-Fillol and Bernd Theilen for their inestimable
guidance and support during the development of this chapter. I am also grateful for
the discussion and valuable comments of Antonio Quesada and Carolina Manzano.
Discussions during the congress XXVIII Jornadas de Economía Industrial at IE
University (Segovia, Spain), the XXXVIII Simposio de la Asociación Española de
Economía at Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo (Santander, Spain), the
Workshop on Industrial and Public Economics at Universitat Rovira i Virgili (Reus,
Spain), and the seminar at Universitat Rovira i Virgili (Reus, Spain) also helped to
improve this chapter.
2.1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that innovation is a key issue for competitiveness and eco-
nomic growth. For example, the EU includes research and innovation as fundamental
aspects of smart, sustainable and inclusive growthin the Horizon 2020 strategy (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2014), and the American Strategy for Innovation reckons that
Americas future economic growth and international competitiveness depend on our
capacity to innovate(White House, 2014). In this context, rms often argue that
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) constitute leverage for innovation. However, it is
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well known that M&As may have many undesirable repercussions. Particularly, hor-
izontal mergers reduce competition and constitute a major concern for competition
authorities (Röller et al., 2000). Therefore, it is especially relevant to understand
and assess the consequences of M&As for the innovative potential of rms.
The European Commission in its Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Merg-
ers (2004) includes the evaluation of R&D and innovation e¤ects. Similarly, the US
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission consider innovation e¤ects
in their Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010).1 In practice, however, innovation ef-
fects in horizontal mergers are di¢ cult to assess due to their intrinsic uncertainty
(Shapiro, 2010). Consequently, the European Commission only takes them into ac-
count when claimed by the parties involved in a merger. Until now, innovation-
related potential advantages have not been decisive in the prohibition or allowance
of horizontal mergers (Veugelers, 2012). In the US, R&D and innovation e¤ects also
play a modest role in merger evaluation decisions. However, the US Antitrust Mod-
ernization Commission has recommended giving greater weight to R&D e¢ ciencies
(Katz and Shelanski, 2007).
The di¢ culty in evaluating the e¤ects of mergers on innovation might also come
from the lack of consensus in the literature results. Since an empirical point of
view, Cassiman et al. (2005) nd that mergers increase innovation in the case of
technologically complementary M&As. While, Cloodt et al. (2006) and Colombo
and Rabbiosi (2014) nd a negative e¤ect on innovative performance. Cloodt et al.
(2006) consider technological and non-technological M&As and their e¤ects on the
long run, and Colombo and Rabbiosi (2014) analyse horizontal acquisitions among
rms with technological similarity. Nevertheless, nowadays, there is no theoretical
analysis of the direct impact of horizontal mergers on R&D in the literature. Instead,
the relationship between mergers and R&D has been evaluated indirectly as, on the
one hand, the e¤ect of mergers on competition and, on the other hand, the impact
of competition on innovation, which are rather well understood (Veugelers, 2012).
However, as the models in these literatures use di¤erent frameworks, it is not clear
to which extend their results can be applied to a di¤erent context in which inno-
vation and merger decisions are taken simultaneously. On this ground, this paper
1The most recent updated version of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), Section 6:4.,
includes an analysis of innovation and product variety as entirely new aspects to be evaluated.
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studies the consequences of downstream and upstream mergers for rmsinnovation
decisions inside an integrated theoretical framework.
We model a vertically related industry with an upstream and a downstream duopoly.2
Upstream rms supply a homogeneous input to downstream rms, which produce a
di¤erentiated nal good. In our setting, a downstream rm can reduce its unit cost
by undertaking process innovation,3 stemming from its R&D e¤ort and the spillovers
derived from the other rms R&D. The innovation decision is reected by a binary
variable, which represents whether a downstream rm engages in R&D activities or
not. The R&D e¤orts are costly and reduce the downstream prots. We consider
three di¤erent market structures: i) the Base Case without mergers, ii) Upstream
Integration, and iii) Downstream Integration.
The main ndings of the paper are as follows. First, both downstream and up-
stream mergers a¤ect downstream rmsinnovation decisions. Second, concerning
total innovation e¤ort it is shown that Upstream Integration has a negative impact
on innovation, while Downstream Integration has a positive e¤ect. Third, regarding
consumer welfare, it is shown that, for a given innovation strategy across scenarios,
it is maximized in the absence of mergers. In addition, we conrm that upstream
mergers are detrimental to consumer welfare. By contrast, and most interestingly,
downstream mergers can be consumer welfare enhancing when the markets are suf-
ciently small.
The paper is organized as follows. The literature review is presented in Section 2.
In Section 3, we present the three scenarios considered: the Base Case (Subsection
3:1), Upstream Integration (Subsection 3:2), and Downstream Integration (Subsec-
tion 3:3). Section 4 studies the implications of horizontal mergers for consumer
welfare. Finally, Section 5 presents some policy implications and closes the paper.
The positivity, second-order and stability conditions and all the proofs are provided
in the Appendix.
2According to Banerjee and Lin (2003), much corporate R&D is conducted in a supplier-
customer context.
3Von Hippel (1988) nds that more than two-thirds of rst-to-market innovations are domi-
nated by end-users. Retailers engage in direct interactions with end customers, unlike most man-
ufacturers, which let them capture their changing needs and o¤er innovative products and services
(Sorescu et al., 2011).
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2.2 Literature Review
The literature has still not provided a theoretical framework for the analysis of the
direct e¤ects of mergers on innovation.4 Nevertheless, some authors have provided
empirical evidence with di¤erent results. Cassiman et al. (2005) nd a positive
e¤ect of M&As on innovation when rms are technologically complementary and
do not compete in the same market. Cloodt et al. (2006) analyse technological
and non-technological M&As, nding that, in the long run, there is a negative
e¤ect on the post-M&Asinnovative performance of acquiring rms. Colombo and
Rabbiosi (2014) nd that horizontal acquisitions among rms with technological
similarity, negatively a¤ect post-acquisition innovation performance. Even though,
the impact on consumer welfare remains unclear. Thus, the aim of this paper is
to provide such a theoretical framework to study the consequences of upstream and
downstream horizontal mergers for rmsinnovation decisions and consumer welfare.
To do so, we connect two strands of the literature. On the one hand, we rely on
the literature on vertical relations and innovation and, on the other hand, on the
literature that analyses downstream and upstream horizontal mergers in a vertically
related industry.
Regarding the literature on vertical relations and innovation, Banerjee and Lin
(2003) study innovation in the presence of vertical relations. The authors present a
theoretical model in which a monopoly upstream rm supplies an intermediate good
to several downstream rms. The downstream rms can reduce their marginal unit
cost by undertaking R&D activities. As a result, the upstream monopoly increases
the input price, a¤ecting the downstream rmsincentive to innovate. Fixed-price
contracts between upstream and downstream rms can be a means of controlling the
downstream production costs and stimulating innovation at this level.
Regarding the branch of the literature analysing horizontal mergers in a vertically-
related industry and focusing on downstream mergers, von Ungern-Sternberg (1996)
nds that they lead to a reduction in the nal price when retailers act as price takers.
In the same vein, Dobson andWaterson (1997) obtain a similar result when retail ser-
vices are regarded as very close substitutes. From a di¤erent perspective, Lommerud
4Cassiman et al. (2005) present an extensive literature review on nancial economics, industrial
organization, and strategic and technology management, which gives many indirect insights into
the relationship between M&As and R&D.
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et al. (2005) and Faulí-Oller and Sandonis (2010) analyse the merger consequences
for input prices. Lommerud et al. (2005) nd that potential merger partners at
the downstream level should take into account the presence of market power at the
upstream level. Faulí-Oller and Sandonis (2010) show that downstream mergers
lead to lower wholesale prices, which translate into lower nal prices when there are
two su¢ ciently di¤erentiated suppliers in terms of e¢ ciency. Finally, Symeonidis
(2010) nds that downstream mergers may raise the consumer surplus and overall
welfare when there is quantity competition, upstream agents are independent, and
bargaining is over a uniform input price.5
Considering upstream mergers, Milliou and Petrakis (2007) show that upstream
rms prefer to merge (not to merge) under wholesale-price contracts (two-part tari¤
contracts). They conclude that upstream horizontal mergers should not be allowed,
although they can generate some e¢ ciency gains.
A couple of papers study mergers both at the upstream and at the downstream
level. First, Ziss (1995) shows that upstream mergers are typically anti-competitive
under very general demand and cost conditions, whereas downstream mergers are
pro-competitive both in the presence and in the absence of intra-brand competi-
tion, and for both price and output competition at the downstream level. Second,
Horn and Wolinsky (1988) demonstrate that merger incentives are present when the
downstream rms compete in the nal goodsmarket.
2.3 The Model
Consider an industry with two upstream and two downstream rms denoted by Ui
and Di, with i = 1; 2, respectively. Each upstream rm produces a homogenous
input which is transformed by downstream rms into a nal good in a one-to-one
proportion. An exclusive upstream-downstream relationship is assumed, such that
Di purchases its input only from Ui.
The downstream demand functions are derived from the maximization of the
5The opposite result is obtained when there is price competition, the upstream agents are not
independent, the bargaining is over a two-part tari¤, or the bargaining covers both the input price
and the level of output.
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welfare function of a representative consumer (as in Bowley, 1924)
U = u (M) + aqi + aqj   1
2
 
q2i + q
2
j

+ 2dqiqj

, i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j,
subject to the budget constraint
Y =M + piqi + pjqj,
where qi is the quantity and pi is the price of good i,M is the quantity of other goods
consumed, Y denotes income, parameter d 2 (0; 1) measures the degree of product
di¤erentiation,6 and a > 0. The resulting downstream demand function is
qi =
a
1 + d
  1
1  d2pi +
d
1  d2pj. (2.3.1)
When the products are independent (i.e., d = 0), Di is a monopolist in its market.
As the products become closer substitutes (i.e., as d increases), the competition in-
tensity in the downstream market increases.
The prots of Di are given by
Di (xi, xj) = (pi   pwi   ci) qi   xi, (2.3.2)
where pwi is the wholesale price that Di pays per unit of input to Ui, and ci =
c   xi   xj is Dis cost function. The unit production cost c is reduced by
xi, where xi 2 f0; 1g is a binary variable that denotes the rms own R&D e¤ort
with  2 [0; 1] and xj stands for the spillovers stemming from the competitors
innovation e¤ort xj with  2 [0; 1] being the spillover intensity parameter.7 Finally,
 is the unit cost of innovation with  > 0. We assume that c   (1 + ), such that
ci  0.
6The unilateral e¤ects, the role of price/cost margins, and market denition are three
related issues that become relevant when a merge proposal is investigated in markets
with di¤erentiated products (Shapiro, 2010). The level of product di¤erentiation is rel-
evant when a merger proposal is evaluated. In the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
(US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 2010), Sections 6.1 and 6.2 address
the pricing and bidding competition among suppliers of di¤erentiated products.
7In some related literature, the intensity of spillovers is associated with the protection of the
intellectual property. High (low) values of spillovers mean that there is weak (strict) protection of
intellectual property.
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The prots of Ui are given by
Ui = (pwi   cU) qUi, (2.3.3)
where cU is the upstream unit cost and qUi = qi because inputs are transformed into
outputs in a one-to-one proportion.
The timing of the game is as follows. In Stage 1, the downstream rms decide
whether to innovate or not by choosing strategy xi 2 f1, 0g, where xi = 1 indicates
that Di innovates, and xi = 0 that Di does not innovate. In Stage 2, the upstream
rms maximise equation (2.3.3) by choosing their wholesale prices pwi. Finally,
in Stage 3, the downstream rms choose simultaneously and independently pi to
maximise equation (2.3.2). The game is solved by backward induction.
2.3.1 The Base Case
In the absence of mergers, the Stage-3 prot maximization yields the following reac-
tion function
pi =
1
2
[(1  d) a+ ci + dpj + pwi] . (2.3.4)
Dis price depends positively on the wholesale price pwi and on its competitors price
pj. The equilibrium price and output are
pi =
(2 + d) (1  d) a+ 2 (ci + pwi) + d (cj + pwj)
4  d2 , (2.3.5)
qi =
(2 + d) (1  d) a  (2  d2) (ci + pwi) + d (cj + pwj)
(4  d2) (1  d2) . (2.3.6)
As products become closer substitutes (i.e., as d! 1), rm js unit cost and whole-
sale price a¤ect rm is price and output positively.
In Stage 2, the upstream rms maximise equation (2:3:3) by choosing their whole-
sale prices pwi. The upstream rmsreaction functions are
pwi =
(2 + d) (1  d) a+ (2  d2) (cU   ci) + d (pwj + cj)
2 (2  d2) . (2.3.7)
We observe that the wholesale prices are strategic complements as long as d > 0.
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The equilibrium wholesale price is
p0wi (xi; xj) =
1
4

2 (a+ cU   ci)  d (2a  2cU   ci   cj)
4  d  2d2  
d (ci   cj)
4 + d  2d2

, (2.3.8)
where superindex 0 makes reference to the Base Case. Regarding the e¤ect of R&D
e¤ort on the wholesale prices in equation (2:3:8) we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1 Firm is R&D e¤ort produces an increase in its own wholesale price p0wi,
as well as in its competitors wholesale price p0wj. The positive e¤ects of Dis R&D
e¤ort on both wholesale prices decreases with product di¤erentiation.
An increase in Dis R&D e¤ort reduces its own unit cost ci, which raises Dis
prots. As a consequence, Ui increases its wholesale price to extract part of these
additional prots. Since the wholesale prices are strategic complements, Uj also
increases its wholesale price.8 As the products become closer substitutes, the down-
stream prices fall and the scope for further price reductions is more limited. Thus,
the e¤ect of the downstream R&D e¤ort on the wholesale prices decreases.
Looking at equation (2:3:4), we can now identify two di¤erentiated e¤ects of R&D
e¤orts on consumer prices. On the one hand, there is a direct negative e¤ect: R&D
e¤ort reduces the unit costs, which is transferred to a price reduction. On the other
hand, there is an indirect positive e¤ect: R&D e¤ort increases the wholesale prices
(as shown in Lemma 1), which in turn yield an increase in the consumer prices.
Substituting equation (2:3:8) into equations (2:3:5) and (2:3:6), we obtain the
Stage-2 Nash equilibrium downstream price and output
p0i (xi; xj) =
2 (1  d) (3  d2) a+ (2  d2) cU
(2  d) (4  d  2d2) +
(2  d2) [(8  3d2) ci + 2d (3  d2) cj]
(4  d2) (4 + d  2d2) (4  d  2d2) , (2.3.9)
q0i (xi; xj) =
(2  d2) (a  cU)
(2  d) (1 + d) (4  d  2d2)  
(2  d2) [(8  9d2 + 2d4) ci   d (2  d2) cj]
(4  d2) (1  d2) (4 + d  2d2) (4  d  2d2) , (2.3.10)
8The fact that Uj increases its wholesale price due to Dis R&D e¤ort is known as a rising rival
cost e¤ect, as noted by Banerjee and Lin (2003).
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and plugging these values into equation (2:3:2), we obtain the SPNE downstream
and upstream prots
0Di (xi; xj) =
 
1  d2 q0i (xi; xj)2   xi, (2.3.11)
0Ui (xi; xj) = q
0
i (xi; xj)
2 (4  d2) (1  d2)
(2  d2) . (2.3.12)
From the above expressions, we can observe that the upstream and downstream
prots decrease as the products become closer substitutes. For the ensuing analysis,
let us denote W  (a  c  cU) and make the following assumption, which ensures
positivity of the prices and outputs (see Appendix 2:6 for further details). For the
sake of simplicity and to simplify the notation, we will refer toW as the market size,
although it also comprises the downstream and upstream unit costs.
Assumption 1 Let W > W  (d )
(1 d) delimit the relevant region in our analysis.
The condition in Assumption 1 comes from the positivity conditions, which are
thoroughly explained in Appendix 2:6. In Stage 1, the downstream rms choose their
R&D strategy to maximise their prots. We compare the equilibrium downstream
prots 0i (xi; xj) under the three innovation strategies considered, i.e., when both
downstream rms innovate, when neither of them innovates, and when only one of
them innovates.
Considering the possible innovation strategies that can be chosen by the down-
stream rms, we may have four equilibrium regions, which are delimited by functions
1 (d) and 2 (d) in Fig.2:1, which are implicitly dened by 0i (1, 0)  0i (0, 0) = 0,
and 0i (1, 1)  0i (0, 1) = 0, respectively. The function 1 (d) is obtained from Dis
unilateral incentive to innovate, and 2 (d) is obtained from Dis incentive to inno-
vate when Dj also innovates. In Region 1, both rms engage in innovation strategies.
This equilibrium occurs for su¢ ciently low values of product di¤erentiation (d) and
spillover intensity (). Multiple equilibria arise in Region 2 and Region 3. On the
one hand, in Region 2, the downstream rms follow symmetric innovation strategies
and either both of them innovate or neither of them innovates. On the other hand,
in Region 3, we have two asymmetric equilibria in which only one rm innovates.
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Finally, in Region 4, no rm innovates.
Fig. 2:1. Innovation equilibria in the base case.
Lemma 2 below species the conditions under which the di¤erent innovation
equilibria exist.
Lemma 2 In the Base Case, the equilibria in innovation strategies are characterized
as follows:
i) for  (d) < min f1 (d) ; 2 (d)g, both rms engage in innovation (Region 1),
ii) for 1 (d) <  (d) < 2 (d), there are symmetric multiple equilibria of the type
f(1; 1) ; (0; 0)g (Region 2),
iii) for 2 (d) <  (d) < 1 (d), there are asymmetric multiple equilibria of the type
f(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g (Region 3),
iv) for  (d) > max f1 (d) ; 2 (d)g, neither rm innovates (Region 4).
We have di=dW > 0, di=d > 0, and di=d < 0, with i = 1; 2 for W > W .
Lemma 2 suggests that rms optimally decide to innovate (not to innovate) when
the spillovers are low (high) and the products are su¢ ciently independent (close
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substitutes).9 On the one hand, the e¤ect of d on innovation is favourable as pointed
out in Lemma 1. On the other hand, the e¤ect of  is negative since rm i can
benet from rm js R&D e¤ort. For high values of d and , we observe that the
net e¤ect is negative, giving rise to an equilibrium without innovation.
Examining the e¤ect of the parameters on 1 (d) and 2 (d), a comparative static
exercise can be conducted, in which the e¤ects obtained are as expected. When the
cost of innovation () increases, the region where both downstream rms innovate (do
not innovate) shrinks (expands). Di¤erently, the market size (W ) and the marginal
benet of R&D () have a positive e¤ect on innovation.10 In the next section, we
consider an upstream horizontal merger while the downstream duopoly remains and
we study its e¤ects on the equilibrium innovation strategies.
2.3.2 Upstream Integration
Having explained the Base Case, our attention now shifts to the Upstream Integration
scenario, in which upstream rms form a monopoly U , which produces a homogenous
input to downstream rms. Consequently, the upstream demand is given by
qU =
X
i=1;2
qi (2.3.13)
and, therefore, the upstream prot function becomes
U =
X
i=1;2
(pwi   cU) qi. (2.3.14)
Stage 3 is as in the Base Case. In Stage 2, the integrated upstream rm chooses
its prot-maximizing wholesale prices pwi, which are given by
pTwi (xi; xj) =
1
2
(a+ cU   ci) , (2.3.15)
where superindex T makes reference to a merger at the top (upstream merger). In-
9There are two regions with multiple equilibria. Thus, there is a parsimonious transition between
the two regions with a unique equilibrium.
10The described e¤ect of parameters is satised forW > W . See Appendix 2:7, Proof of Lemma
2 for further details of the denition of W .
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terestingly, unlike the Base Case, the wholesale price depends neither on product
di¤erentiation nor on the competitors unit cost (cj). The reason is that, now, the
upstream monopoly has the market power to determine both wholesale prices and,
thus, the level of product di¤erentiation is irrelevant. Substituting equation (2:3:15)
into equations (2:3:5) and (2:3:6), we obtain the Stage-2 Nash equilibrium down-
stream prices and outputs:
pTi (xi; xj) =
(2 + d) [a (3  2d) + cU ] + 2ci + dcj
2 (2  d) (2 + d) , (2.3.16)
qTi (xi; xj) =
(2 + d) (1  d) (a  cU)  (2  d2) ci + dcj
2 (2  d) (2 + d) (1  d) (1 + d) . (2.3.17)
Notice that, as the products become increasingly independent (i.e., as d! 0), the
downstream rms become unrelated; therefore, the price and the output converge to
the ones under the Base Case, in which there are exclusive relationships between the
upstream and the downstream rms. The Stage-2 downstream and upstream prots,
respectively, can be expressed as a function of the output:
TDi (xi; xj) =
 
1  d2 qTi (xi; xj)2   xi, (2.3.18)
TU (xi; xj) =
X
i=1;2
 
pTwi (xi; xj)  cU

qTi (xi; xj)

. (2.3.19)
From equation (2:3:18) we can observe that the expression is similar to that obtained
in the Base Case (i.e., prots decrease with d) and the two scenarios converge as
d! 0.
The Stage-1 equilibrium analysis in innovation strategies under Upstream Inte-
gration gives rise to four equilibrium regions (as before), which are shown in Fig.
2:2. Functions 3 (d) and 4 (d) correspond to functions 1 (d) and 2 (d) in Fig.
2:1. The di¤erence with respect to the Base Case is that the functions have moved
leftward.
52
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
INNOVATION, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND COOPERATIVE R&D STRATEGIES 
Guiomar Ibáñez Zárate 
 
 
2.3. THE MODEL
Fig. 2:2. Innovation equilibria under upstream integration.
We now obtain Lemma 3, which species the conditions for the di¤erent innovation
equilibria to arise.
Lemma 3 Under Upstream Integration the equilibria in innovation strategies are
characterized as follows:
i) for  (d) < min f3 (d) ; 4 (d)g, both rms engage in innovation (Region 1),
ii) for 3 (d) <  (d) < 4 (d), there are multiple equilibria of the type (1; 1) and
(0; 0) (Region 2),
iii) for 4 (d) <  (d) < 3 (d), there are asymmetric equilibria of the type (1; 0) and
(0; 1) (Region 3),
iv) for  (d) > max f3 (d) ; 4 (d)g, neither rm innovates (Region 4).
We have di=dW > 0, di=d > 0, and di=d < 0, with i = 3; 4 for W > WN.
From the comparison of Fig. 2:1 and Fig. 2:2, we observe that the region where
both downstream rms engage in innovation is reduced, while the region where no
downstream rm innovates increases. The following proposition that arises from the
results in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 states this formally.
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Proposition 3 Upstream integration has a negative e¤ect on innovation.
Proposition 1 indicates that downstream rms have fewer incentives to innovate
in the presence of an upstream monopoly. This is explained by the fact that the
wholesale prices in scenario T are greater than those in scenario 0, i.e., pTwi (xi; xj) >
p0wi (xi; xj), and the negative e¤ect of innovation on the wholesale prices is now
greater.11 The comparative-static e¤ects of parameters W , , and  are as in the
Base Case.12 This result justies the systematic concerns of competition authorities
regarding horizontal mergers between upstream rms.13 In the next scenario, we
analyse the implications for the equilibrium innovation strategies of a downstream
merger (while the upstream duopoly remains).
2.3.3 Downstream Integration
Under Downstream Integration, the merged entity becomes a multiproduct monopoly
that transforms inputs into two di¤erentiated products.14 Thus, the downstream
prot function is now dened as
D =
X
i=1;2
[(pi   pwi   ci) qi   xi] , (2.3.20)
since there is a unique decision-maker.
In Stage 3, the downstream rm D maximises its prots by choosing prices p1
and p2. The Stage-3 Nash equilibrium prices and output are given by
pi =
1
2
(a+ ci + pwi) , (2.3.21)
qi =
(1  d) a  ci + pwi   d (cj + pwj)
2 (1  d) (1 + d) . (2.3.22)
11It can be checked that @p
0
wi
@ci
@ci
@xi
<
@pTwi
@ci
@ci
@xi
, where @p
0
wi
@ci
@ci
@xi
= 4

2 + d4+d 2d2   d4 d 2d2

and
@pTwi
@ci
@ci
@xi
= 2 .
12See Appendix 2:7, Proof of Lemma 3 for further details of the denition of WN.
13The US Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (1982) were written with relatively homo-
geneous, industrial products in mind. This reects the long-standing antitrust concerns about the
performance of concentrated markets for basic industrial commodities (Shapiro, 2010).
14An alternative assumption would be to consider that the integrated rm just produces an
homogeneous output. However, this would require the adjustment of the production process in at
least one of the plants, which might involve additional costs (e.g., because of specic investments
in each of the plants).
54
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
INNOVATION, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND COOPERATIVE R&D STRATEGIES 
Guiomar Ibáñez Zárate 
 
 
2.3. THE MODEL
When the products are independent, having a multimarket monopoly is tantamount
to having two independent monopolies. Therefore, the price in equation (2:3:21) is
the same as that in the Base Case (equation (2:3:5)) for d = 0.
In Stage 2, the upstream rms maximise their prots in equation (2:3:3) by
choosing pwi. The Stage-2 wholesale prices are given by
pBwi (xi, xj) =
(2 + d) [(1  d) a+ cU ]  ci (2  d2) + dcj
(2 + d) (2  d) , (2.3.23)
where superindex B makes reference to a merger at the bottom (downstream merger).
It emerges that the Stage-2 prices and output are equal to those under Upstream
Integration (see equations (2:3:16) and (2:3:17)). The upstream and downstream
prots are now
BD (xi; xj) =
X
i;j=1;2

(2 + d) (a  cU)  2ci   dcj
2 (2  d) (2 + d) q
B
i   xi

, i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j,
(2.3.24)
BUi (xi; xj) = 2
 
1  d2 qBi (xi; xj)2 . (2.3.25)
In Stage 1, the downstream monopolist rm chooses its R&D strategy regarding
its two products. We compare the equilibrium prots BD (xi; xj) under the three
innovation strategies considered, i.e., to innovate in both products simultaneously,
(1; 1), to innovate just in one product, either (1; 0) or (0; 1), or not to innovate
in either product (0; 0). Considering the possible innovation strategies that can
be chosen by the downstream rm, we may have di¤erent equilibria delimited by
functions 5 (d), 6 (d), and 7 (d), displayed in Fig. 2:3, which are implicitly dened
by BD (1; 1)   BD (0; 0) = 0, BD (1; 1)   BD (1; 0) = 0, and BD (1; 0)   BD (0; 0) = 0,
respectively. In Region 1, for su¢ ciently high values of d and , the downstream
rm innovates in both products. In Region 2, for su¢ ciently low values of product
di¤erentiation and spillover intensity, there is no innovation in either of the two
products. Finally, in Region 3, when the products are close substitutes and there
is a low level of spillover intensity, the downstream monopoly innovates in just one
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product.
Fig. 2:3. Innovation equilibria under downstream integration.
Lemma 4 below species the conditions under which the di¤erent innovation
equilibria exist.
Lemma 4 Under Downstream Integration the equilibria in innovation strategies are
characterized as follows:
i) for  (d) > max f5 (d) ; 6 (d)g, the downstream monopolist innovates in both
products (Region 1),
ii) for  (d) < min f5 (d) ; 7 (d)g, the downstream monopolist does not innovate in
either product (Region 2),
iii) for 7 (d) <  (d) < 6 (d), the downstream monopolist innovates in one product
(Region 3).
We have di=dW < 0, di=d < 0, and di=d > 0, with i = 5; 6; 7.
Comparing the results in Lemma 4 with those of the Base Case, we see that while
the e¤ect of an increase in d on innovation under Downstream Integration remains
positive, now the e¤ect of an increase in  on innovation is positive. The reason
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is that innovation occurs as a result of the internalization of the spillovers when a
downstream merger takes place. The downstream rm engages in innovation in both
products when the knowledge acquired during the innovation process in one product
is highly applicable to the other one. Thus, the presence of a high level of adaptabil-
ity or applicability between innovation projects becomes innovation-enhancing. The
spilloversinternalization reinforces the unit cost reduction associated with innova-
tion. As a consequence, for high values of d and , the equilibrium in innovation
strategies is now (1; 1), whereas it was (0; 0) in the Base Case. The proposition that
follows arises from the comparison of the results in Lemmas 2 and 4.
Proposition 4 Downstream integration has a positive e¤ect on innovation.
Proposition 2 indicates that the downstream rm has more incentives to innovate
in the presence of a downstream monopoly. This is explained by the fact that the
wholesale prices in scenario B are smaller than those in scenario 0, i.e., pBwi (xi; xj) <
p0wi (xi; xj), and the unpleasant e¤ect of innovation on the wholesale prices is now
smoother.15 The comparative static e¤ects of parameters W , , and  have the same
interpretation as in the Base Case, i.e., an increase in W or , enlarges the region
where innovation occurs and an increase in  shrinks it.
At this point, we have analysed the e¤ects on innovation produced by horizontal
mergers at either the upstream or the downstream level. In the next section, we assess
the e¤ects of horizontal mergers on consumer welfare and the policy implications
regarding innovation.
2.4 The E¤ect of Horizontal Mergers on Welfare
We compare the consumer surplus under all the scenarios considered, since a rst
objective upon which merger analysis may be based is the protection of consumer in-
terests(Röller et al., 2000). Competition and antitrust authorities use this criterion
to assess the welfare e¤ects of horizontal mergers. With linear demand functions,
15It can be checked that @p
B
wi
@ci
@ci
@xi
<
@p0wi
@ci
@ci
@xi
, where @p
0
wi
@ci
@ci
@xi
= 4

2 + d4+d 2d2   d4 d 2d2

and
@pBwi
@ci
@ci
@xi
=
(2 d2)
(4 d2) .
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this is tantamount to comparing quantities. As pointed out by Banal-Estañol et al.
(2008), this is consistent with the current standards used both in the US and the
EU to assess mergers. In the US, the substantial lessening of competition(SLC)
test has been interpreted such that a merger is unlawful if it is likely that it will
lead to an increase in price (i.e., to a decrease in consumer surplus). In the EU, the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that the Commission should take into account,
above all, the interests of consumers when considering e¢ ciency claims of merging
rms (art. 79-81). Subsequent papers, such as Duso et al. (2014) and Flores-Fillol
et al. (2014), have also used this criterion.
Before comparing consumer welfare across scenarios, our model conrms that
innovation is benecial for consumers for a given scenario (0, T, and B).
Lemma 5 Considering all the possible innovation strategies that can be chosen by
downstream rms in each scenario, q (1; 1) > q (1; 0) = q (0; 1) > q (0; 0), for
 2 f0; T; Bg.
Based on a pairwise comparison of equilibrium total output (q = qi + qj) under
Upstream and Downstream Integration (see equation (2:3:17)) with respect to the
Base Case (see equation (2:3:10)), the following proposition arises.
Proposition 5 For a given innovation strategy across scenarios,
i) q0 (1; 1) > qT (1; 1) = qB (1; 1),
ii) q0 (0; 0) > qT (0; 0) = qB (0; 0), and
iii) q0 (1; 0) > qT (1; 0) = qB (1; 0).
Therefore, consumer welfare is maximised in scenario 0, and it is the same under
scenarios T and B.
In the light of the previous proposition, we nd that consumer welfare is max-
imised in the absence of mergers when merger formation does not a¤ect the in-
novation strategy chosen by downstream rms. Thus, upstream and downstream
competition enhances consumer welfare in a two-tier market structure with two dif-
ferentiated outputs. However, as we have seen in Section 2, merger formation a¤ects
the equilibrium in innovation strategies. For example, under Upstream Integration,
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innovation requires products to be highly di¤erentiated and a low level of spillovers.
By contrast, under Downstream Integration, innovation requires products to be close
substitutes and a high level of spillovers (see Figs. 2:2 and 2:3). Therefore, to per-
form a comprehensive welfare analysis, the comparison of total output must take
account of changes in innovation strategies under di¤erent merger scenarios.
First, let us compare scenario 0 and scenario T (see jointly Figs. 2:1 and 2:2).
Thus, if we start from a particular point (d; ) in scenario 0 such tat the innova-
tion equilibrium strategy is (1; 1), it is relevant to compare the total output at this
point, i.e., q0 (1; 1), with respect to the total output corresponding to the other in-
novation strategies that can occur at this point under scenario T : either qT (0; 0) or
qTf(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g.16 Now, if we consider another particular point in scenario 0, at
which the innovation strategy is f(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g, it is relevant to compare the total
output at this point with the total output corresponding to the innovation strategy
that occurs at this point under scenario T , which is qT (0; 0). We obtain the following
result.
Proposition 6 When rms adopt di¤erent innovation strategies in equilibrium un-
der scenarios 0 and T , we have
i) q0 (1; 1) > qT (0; 0),
ii) q0 (1; 1) > qTf(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g,
iii) q0f(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g > qT (0; 0),
and, therefore, upstream horizontal mergers are detrimental to innovation and con-
sumer welfare.
Proposition 4 conrms that upstream integration undermines innovation and con-
sumer welfare, because the upstream monopoly under scenario T sets the greatest
wholesale prices of all the scenarios considered. As a result of the horizontal inte-
gration between upstream rms, the region where both rms innovate is reduced.
More precisely, a share of Region 1 in scenario 0 (Fig. 2:1), where both downstream
rms innovate, falls into Regions 3 and 4 in scenario T (Fig. 2:2), i.e., regions where
either just one downstream rm innovates or neither of them engages in innovation
activities.
16Note that the comparison between q0 (1; 1) and qT (1; 1) has already been made in Proposition
3.
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Nowwe consider Figs. 2:1 and 2:3 corresponding to scenarios 0 andB. We observe
that the following comparisons become relevant: q0f(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g versus qB (1; 1),
q0 (0; 0) versus qB (1; 1), and q0 (0; 0) versus qBf(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g. Let us dene W y1 
(2+d)(1 d)(1+)
d
and W y2 
(4 d 2d2)(1+)
d
, where W y2 > W
y
1 . Then, the following
proposition arises.
Proposition 7 WhenW 2

W;W y1

and rms adopt di¤erent innovation strategies
in equilibrium under scenarios 0 and B, we have
i) qB (1; 1) > q0f(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g,
ii) qB (1; 1) > q0 (0; 0),
iii) qBf(1; 0) ; (0; 1)g > q0 (0; 0),
and, therefore, downstream horizontal mergers are innovation and consumer welfare
enhancing.
For W > max
n
W y2 ;W
o
, the opposite results are obtained. For the remaining cases
downstream horizontal mergers can be consumer welfare enhancing depending on d
and .
Comparing scenario 0 with scenario B, we observe that consumer welfare depends
on the size of W . When the markets are relatively small (i.e., for W 2

W;W y1

)
and a downstream merger implies a change in the equilibrium R&D e¤ort, consumer
welfare is larger under downstream integration than under the Base Case. Innovation
enhances consumer welfare (see Lemma 5). In most cases, horizontal mergers favour
innovation but are detrimental to consumer welfare, i.e., there is a trade-o¤ between
promoting innovation (which is supposed to increase consumer welfare in the long
run) and increasing consumer welfare in the short run. However, Proposition 5 above
shows that there is no such trade-o¤ when the markets are su¢ ciently small and
therefore, in this case, downstream horizontal mergers are always consumer welfare
enhancing.17
17For W 2

W y1 ;W
y
2

, the total output can be greater under either scenario 0 or scenario B
depending on the particular innovation strategy followed by each of the rms.
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2.5 Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
This paper explores the e¤ect of horizontal mergers in a vertically-related industry
with two upstream and two downstream rms, which can undertake innovation ac-
tivities. We rst conclude that upstream integration (downstream integration) has a
negative (positive) e¤ect on innovation. Regarding consumer welfare, we show that
downstream mergers can be benecial.
The policy implications of this paper are as follows. In the one hand, horizon-
tal mergers between upstream rms should always be forbidden because they are
detrimental to innovation and consumer welfare. On the other hand, downstream
horizontal mergers are innovation-enhancing, even though, they may have a negative
e¤ect on consumer welfare in large markets (derived from innovation is expected an
increase in consumer welfare in the long run). Interestingly, it is shown that, when
markets are su¢ ciently small, downstream horizontal mergers can even be benecial
for consumers in the short run. As a consequence, competition authorities should
distinguish between upstream and downstream horizontal mergers and, in the case
of downstream mergers, assess their short-run and long-run e¤ects.
The results in this paper can be generalized in di¤erent directions. First, enlarging
the number of rms should not change our results substantially since we consider
a duopoly setting with price competition and product di¤erentiation, in which the
prices converge towards the marginal costs (i.e., perfect competition) as the degree of
product di¤erentiation decreases. Second, a multiple-sourcing relationship between
upstream and downstream rms would increase the competition at the upstream
level and, therefore, increase the negative e¤ect of upstream mergers (this extension
would connect our model with the literature on bundling). However, the presence
of product di¤erentiation among the upstream rms would downplay this negative
e¤ect.
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2.6. APPENDIX. POSITIVITY, SECOND-ORDER, AND STABILITY
CONDITIONS
2.6 Appendix. Positivity, Second-Order, and Sta-
bility Conditions
In this appendix, we elucidate the conditions that ensure positive quantities and
compliance with second-order and stability conditions in all the scenarios considered.
2.6.1 Positivity conditions
Claim 3 All the prices and quantities under the Base Case, Upstream Integration,
and Downstream Integration are positive for W > W  (d )
1 d .
The threshold valueW is obtained asW = max fW1; :::;W8g, where the di¤erent
Wi for r i = 1; :::; 8 come from the following positivity conditions.
 Base Case
In Stage 2, a necessary condition for equation (2:3:8) to be positive is
W > W1   2d  d
3 +  (9d2   8  2d4)  cU (4  d  2d2) (4 + d  2d2)
(1  d) (2 + d) (4 + d  2d2) .
In Stage 3, the price and output in equations (2:3:9) and (2:3:10) are positive when
W > W2   (2  d
2) (1 + )  (c+ cU) (2  d) (4  d  2d2)
2 (1  d) (3  d2) ,
W > W3   2d  d
3   8 + 9d2   2d4
(1  d) (2 + d) (4 + d  2d2) .
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 Upstream Integration
In Stage 3, the price and output in equations (2:3:16) and (2:3:17) are positive when
W > W4   (2 + d+ 2 + d)  2 (c+ cU) (2  d) (2 + d)
(2 + d) (3  2d) ,
W > W5   d  2 + d
2
(1  d) (2 + d) .
 Downstream Integration
In Stage 2, the wholesale price in equation (2:3:23) is positive when
W > W6   (d  2 + d
2)  cU (2  d) (2 + d)
(1  d) (2 + d) . 
2.6.2 Second-order conditions
 Base Case
From equation (2:3:2), in Stage 3, we obtain
@2Di
@p2i
=   2
1  d2 < 0.
From equation (2:3:3), in Stage 2, we obtain
@2Ui
@p2wi
=   2 (2  d
2)
(4  d2) (1  d2) < 0.
 Upstream Integration
From equation (2:3:2), in Stage 3, we obtain
@2TDi
@p2i
=   2
1  d2 < 0.
From equation (2:3:19), in Stage 2, we obtain
@2TU
@p2wi
=   2 (2  d
2)
(4  d2) (1  d2) < 0,
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and
@2TU
@p2wi
@2TU
@p2wj
 

@2TU
@pwi@pwj
2
=
4 (2  d2)2
(4  d2)2 (1  d2)2  
4d2
(4  d2)2 (1  d2)2
=
4
(4  d2) (1  d2) > 0.
 Downstream Integration
From equation (2:3:20), in Stage 3, we obtain
@2BD
@p2i
=   2
1  d2 < 0,
and
@2BD
@p2i
@2BD
@p2j
 

@2BD
@pi@pj
2
=
4
(1  d2)2  
4d2
(1  d2)2 =
4
1  d2 > 0.
From equation (2:3:3), in Stage 2, we obtain
@2BUi
@p2wi
=   1
1  d2 < 0. 
2.6.3 Stability conditions
The Nash equilibria in Stages 2 and 3 need to comply with the stability conditions
(see chapter 2 in Vives (2001) for further details).
 Base Case
The Stage-3 Nash equilibrium prices p0i (xi; xj) and p
0
j (xi; xj) are stable for@20i@p2i @
20j
@p2j
 >  @20i@pi@pj @
20j
@pi@pj
 =) 4(1  d2)2 > d2(1  d2)2 ,
which is always observed.
The Stage-2 Nash equilibrium wholesale prices p0wi (xi; xj) and p
0
wj (xi; xj) are stable
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for @20Ui@p2wi @
20Uj
@p2wj
 >  @20Ui@pwi@pwj @
20Uj
@pwi@pwj
 =)
4 (2  d2)2
(4  d2)2 (1  d2)2 >
d2
(4  d2)2 (1  d2)2 ,
which is always observed.
 Upstream Integration
In Stage 3, the stability condition is the same as in the Base Case.
 Downstream Integration
The Stage-2 Nash equilibrium wholesale prices pBwi (xi; xj) and p
B
wj (xi; xj) are stable
for @2BUi@p2wi @
2BUj
@p2wj
 >
 @2BUi@pwi@pwj @
2BUj
@pwi@pwj
 =) 1(1  d2)2 > d24 (1  d2)2 ,
which is always observed. 
2.7 Appendix. Proofs of Lemmas and Proposi-
tions
2.7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First, notice that @p
0
wi
@xi
> 0 is tantamount to @p
0
wi
@ci
@ci
@xi
> 0, which is always observed
since
@p0wi
@ci
=  1
4
 
2  d
4 d 2d2 +
d
4+d 2d2

< 0 and @ci
@xi
=   < 0.
Second,
@p0wj
@xi
> 0 is tantamount to
@p0wj
@cj
@cj
@xi
> 0, which is always observed since
@p0wj
@cj
=  1
4
 
2  d
4 d 2d2 +
d
4+d 2d2

< 0 and @cj
@xi
=   < 0.
Finally, @
2p0wi
@xi@d
=  
4
h
d(1+4d)
4 d 2d2 +
d(1 4d)
4+d 2d2 +
1
4 d 2d2 +
1
4+d 2d2
i
< 0 and
@2p0wj
@xi@d
=  
4
h
d(1+4d)
4 d 2d2 +
d(1 4d)
4+d 2d2 +
1
4 d 2d2 +
1
4+d 2d2
i
< 0. 
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2.7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Dene 1(d) implicitly by F  0Di (1; 0)   0Di (0; 0) = 0, where 0Di (1; 0) and
0Di (0; 0) are obtained from equation (2:3:11). It follows that 
0
Di (1; 0) > 
0
Di (0; 0)
for (d) < 1(d) and 0Di (1; 0) < 
0
Di (0; 0) for  (d) > 1 (d), where 1 (d) is given
by
1 (d) =
d (2  d2)3 [W (1  d) (2 + d) (4 + d  2d2) +  (8  9d2 + 2d4)] pA
2d2 (2  d2)4 ,
(2.7.1)
with A = 2d2 (1  d) (2 + d)2 (2  d2)4 (4 + d  2d2)2h
W 2 (1  d) (2  d2)2 +  (2  d)2 (1 + d) (4  d  2d2)2
i
.
Similarly, dene 2(d) implicitly by G  0Di (1; 1)   0Di (0; 1) = 0, where 0Di (1; 1)
and 0Di (0; 1) are obtained from equation (2:3:11). It follows that 
0
Di (1; 1) >
0Di (0; 1) for (d) < 2(d) and 
0
Di (1; 1) < 
0
Di (0; 1) for (d) > 2(d), where 2(d)
is given by
2 (d) =
d (W + ) (2  d2) (8  9d2 + 2d4)
2d (2  d2) (16  2d  18d2 + d3 + 4d4)
 
2
p
B (2 + d)2 (1  d2) (4 + d  2d2)2 (4  d  2d2)2
2d (2  d2) (16  2d  18d2 + d3 + 4d4)
 
h
Wd2 (2  d2)2    (64  140d2 + 109d4   35d6 + 4d8)
i
d (2  d2) (16  2d  18d2 + d3 + 4d4) , (2.7.2)
with B =

2 (2  d2)3 Wd(1 d)(2 d
2)
2
[Wd(2 d2)+2(2 d)(1+d)(4 d 2d2)]
(2 d)4(1 d)(1+d)2(2+d)2(4 d 2d2)4(4+d 2d2)2 +
2 (2  d2)3 (4 d 2d
2)
2
(2 d)2(1+d)[2(1 d2)(2 d2) d(16 2d 18d2+d3+4d4)]
(2 d)4(1 d)(1+d)2(2+d)2(4 d 2d2)4(4+d 2d2)2

.
From the properties of 1(d) and 2(d), the di¤erent regions of equilibria arise
straightforwardly. Regarding the partial derivatives from F we obtain:18
d1
dW
=  @F=@W
@F=@
> 0,
d1
d
=  @F=@
@F=@
> 0,
d1
d
=   @F=@
@F=@
< 0,
18In the following we make use of the fact that q0i (1; 1) > q
0
i (1; 0) = q
0
i (0; 1) > q
0
i (0; 0) which is
proven in Lemma 5.
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since
@F
@W
=
2 (2  d2) (1  d2)
(2  d) (1 + d) (4  d  2d2)

q0i (1; 0)  q0i (0; 0)

> 0,
@F
@
= 2
(2  d2) (8  9d2 + 2d4   2d + d3)
(4  d2) (4  d  2d2) (4 + d  2d2) q
0
i (1; 0) > 0,
@F
@
=  1 < 0,
@F
@
=   2d (2  d
2)
2
(4  d2) (4  d  2d2) (4 + d  2d2)q
0
i (1; 0) < 0.
Regarding the partial derivatives from G, we obtain
d2
dW
=  @G=@W
@G=@
> 0,
d2
d
=  @G=@
@G=@
> 0,
d2
d
=   @G=@
@G=@
< 0,
since
@G
@W
=
2 (2  d2) (1  d2)
(2  d) (1 + d) (4  d  2d2)

q0i (1; 1)  q0i (0; 1)

> 0,
@G
@
=
2 (2  d2) (1  d2)
(2  d) (1 + d) (4  d  2d2)

q0i (1; 1)  q0i (0; 1)

> 0,
@G
@
=  1 < 0,
@G
@
=
2 (2  d2) (1  d2)
(2 + d  d2) (4  d  2d2)

q0i (1; 1)  q0i (0; 1)
8  9d2 + 2d4
(2  d  d2) (4 + d  2d2)

< 0,
for W > W ,
where W  =
[64 16d 140d2+26d3+109d4 13d5 35d6+2d7+4d8 d(2 d2)(16 2d 18d2+d3+4d4)]
d(1 d)(2+d)(2 d2)(4+d 2d2) . 
2.7.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Dene 3(d) implicitly by H  TDi (1; 0)   TDi (0; 0) = 0, where TDi (1; 0) and
TDi (0; 0) are obtained from equation (2:3:18). It follows that 
T
Di (1; 0) > 
T
Di (0; 0)
for (d) < 3(d), and TDi (1; 0) < 
T
Di (0; 0) for  (d) > 3 (d), where 3 (d) is given
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by
3 (d) =
W (1  d) (2 + d) +  (2  d2)
d
 q
2d2 (1  d) (2 + d)2 W 2 (1  d) + 4 (2  d)2 (1 + d)
2d2
. (2.7.3)
Similarly, dene 4(d) implicitly by I  TDi (1; 1)   TDi (0; 1) = 0, where TDi (1; 1)
and TDi (0; 1) are obtained from equation (2:3:18). It follows that 
T
Di (1; 1) >
TDi (0; 1) for (d) < 4(d), and 
T
Di (1; 1) < 
T
Di (0; 1) for (d) > 4(d), where 4(d)
is given by
4 (d) =   [Wd (1  d) (2 + d)   (4  2d  3d
2 + d3 + d4)]
2d (4  d  2d2)  
p
M
2d (4  d  2d2) ,
(2.7.4)
with M  2 ( 1 + d) (2 + d)2h
( 1 + d) (Wd+  (2 + d  d2))2 + 4d (2  d)2 (1 + d) (4  d  2d2)
io
.
From the properties of 3(d) and 4(d), the di¤erent regions of equilibria arise
straightforwardly. Regarding the partial derivatives from H we obtain:19
d3
dW
=  @H=@W
@H=@
> 0,
d3
d
=  @H=@
@H=@
> 0,
d3
d
=   @H=@
@H=@
< 0,
since
@H
@W
=
1  d
2  d

qTi (1; 0)  qTi (0; 0)

> 0,
@H
@
=
2  d2   d
4  d2

qTi (1; 0)

> 0,
@H
@
=  1 < 0,
@H
@
=   d
4  d2

qTi (1; 0)

< 0.
19In the following we make use of the fact that qTi (1; 1) > q
T
i (1; 0) = q
T
i (0; 1) > q
T
i (0; 0), which
is proved in Lemma 5.
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Regarding the partial derivatives from I, we obtain
d4
dW
=  @I=@W
@I=@
> 0,
d4
d
=  @I=@
@I=@
> 0,
d4
d
=   @I=@
@I=@
< 0,
since
@I
@W
=
1  d
2  d

qTi (1; 1)  qTi (0; 1)

> 0,
@I
@
=
1  d
2  d

(1 + ) qTi (1; 1) 
2   d2   d
(1  d) (2 + d)q
T
i (0; 1)

> 0, for W > W,
@I
@
=  1 < 0,
@I
@
=
 (1  d)
2  d

qTi (1; 1) 
2  d2
(1  d) (2 + d)q
T
i (0; 1)

< 0, for W > WN,
where W =
( 2+2d+d2 4+d+2d2)
(1 d)(2+d) and W
N =
(4 2d 3d2+d3+d4 4d+d2+2d3)
d(1 d)(2+d) .where
it is easy to check that WN > W. 
2.7.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Straightforward. 
2.7.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Dene 5(d) implicitly by J  BDi (1; 1)   0Di (0; 0) = 0, where BDi (1; 1) and
BDi (0; 0) are obtained from equation (2:3:24). It follows that 
B
Di (1; 1) > 
B
Di (0; 0)
for (d) > 5(d) and BDi (1; 1) < 
B
Di (0; 0) for  (d) < 5 (d), where 5 (d) is given
by
5 (d) =   1
 (4  3d2   2d3)
n


W (1  d) (2 + d)2 +   8  6d2   d3 pSo
(2.7.5)
with S  2 W (1  d) (2 + d)2 +  (8  6d2   d3)2 +
(4  3d2   2d3)
h
   2W (1  d) (2 + d)2 +  (4  3d2   2d3)+ 4 (4  d2)2 (1  d2)i.
Similarly, dene 6(d) implicitly by K  BDi (1; 1)  BDi (1; 0) = 0, where BDi (1; 1)
and BDi (1; 0) are obtained from equation (2:3:24). It follows that 
B
Di (1; 1) >
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BDi (1; 0) for (d) > 6(d) and 
B
Di (1; 1) < 
B
Di (1; 0) for (d) < 6(d), where 6(d)
is given by
6 (d) =
  (W + ) +
q
2

W 2 + 4 (2  d)2 (1 + d)
2
. (2.7.6)
Finally, dene 7(d) implicitly by L  BD (1; 0)  BD (0; 0) = 0, where BD (1; 0) and
BD (0; 0) are obtained from equation (2:3:24). It follows that 
B
D (1; 0) > 
B
D (0; 0) for
(d) > 7(d) and BD (1; 0) < 
B
D (0; 0) for (d) < 7(d), where 7(d) is given by
7 (d) =   1
2 (4  3d2)
 
E   d3 p2 (4  3d2   d3) [N ], (2.7.7)
with E  W (1  d) (2 + d)2 and
N =

W 2 (1  d) (2 + d)2 + (4  3d2 + d3) [ 2W   2 + 4 (4  3d2)].
From the properties of 5(d), 6(d), and 7(d), the di¤erent regions of equilibria arise
straightforwardly. Regarding the partial derivatives from J we obtain:
d5
dW
=  @J=@W
@J=@
< 0,
d5
d
=  @J=@
@J=@
< 0,
d5
d
=   @J=@
@J=@
> 0,
since
@J
@W
=
 (1 + )
(2  d)2 (1 + d) > 0,
@J
@
=
[W +  (1 + )] (1 + )
(2  d)2 (1 + d) > 0,
@J
@
=  2 < 0,
@J
@
=
 [W +  (1 + )]
(2  d)2 (1 + d) > 0.
Regarding the partial derivatives from K, we obtain
d6
dW
=  @K=@W
@K=@
< 0,
d6
d
=  @K=@
@K=@
< 0,
d6
d
=   @K=@
@K=@
> 0,
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since
@K
@W
=
 (1 + )
2 (2  d)2 (1 + d) > 0,
@K
@
=
W (1  d) (2 + d2) (1 + )
2 (4  d2)2 (1  d2) +
T
2 (4  d2)2 (1  d2) > 0, for W > W
|,
with T  4  3d2   2d3   16   12d2   2d3 + 42   3d22   2d32.
@K
@
=  1 < 0,
@K
@
=


W (1  d) (2 + d)2 +  (8  6d2   d3 + 4   3d2   2d3)
2 (4  d2)2 (1  d2) > 0,
where W| =  (4 3d
2 2d3 16 12d2 2d3+42 3d22 2d32)
(1 d)(2+d)2(1+) .
Finally, regarding the partial derivatives from L, we obtain
d7
dW
=  @L=@W
@L=@
< 0,
d7
d
=  @L=@
@L=@
< 0,
d7
d
=   @L=@
@L=@
> 0,
since
@L
@W
=
 (1 + )
2 (2  d)2 (1 + d) > 0,
@L
@
=
W (1  d) (2 + d)2 (1 + ) +  (4  3d2   2d3 + 42   3d22)
2 (4  d2)2 (1  d2) > 0,
@L
@
=  1 < 0,
@L
@
=


W (1  d) (2 + d)2 +  (4   3d2   d3)
2 (4  d2)2 (1  d2) > 0, for W > W
~,
where W~ =
(d3 4+3d2)
(1 d)(2+d)2 and it is easy to check that W > W
~ > W|. 
2.7.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Straightforward. 
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2.7.7 Proof of Lemma 5
In the Base Case ( = 0),
(2  d2) [W +  (1 + )]
(2  d) (1 + d) (4  d  2d2)| {z }
q0(1;1)
>
(2  d2) [2W +  (1 + )]
(2  d) (1 + d) (4  d  2d2)| {z }
q0(1;0)
>
(2  d2) 2W
(2  d) (1 + d) (4  d  2d2)| {z }
q0(0;0)
.
Under Upstream Integration ( = T ) and Downstream Integration ( = B),
W +  (1 + )
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
qT (1;1)=qB(1;1)
>
W + 
2
(1 + )
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
qT (1;0)=qB(1;0)
>
W
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
qT (0;0)=qB(0;0)
. 
2.7.8 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove statement (i), when both downstream rms innovate, we have
4  2d2
4  2d2   d
W +  (1 + )
2 (2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
q0(1;1)
>
W +  (1 + )
2 (2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
qT (1;1)=qB(1;1)
.
To prove statement (ii), when neither of the two downstream rms innovates, we
have
4  2d2
4  2d2   d
W
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
q0(0;0)
>
W
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
qT (0;0)=qB(0;0)
.
To prove statement (iii), when just one downstream rm innovates, we have
4  2d2
4  2d2   d
2W +  (1 + )
2 (2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
q0(1;0)
>
2W +  (1 + )
2 (2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
qT (1;0)=qB(1;0)
. 
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2.7.9 Proof of Proposition 4
To prove statement (i), when both downstream rms innovate under the base case
and neither rm innovates under upstream integration, we have
4  2d2
4  2d2   d
W +  (1 + )
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
q0(1;1)
>
W
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
qT (0;0)
.
To prove statement (ii), when both downstream rms innovate under the base case
and one rm innovates under upstream integration, we have
4  2d2
4  2d2   d
W +  (1 + )
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
q0(1;1)
>
W + 
2
(1 + )
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
qT (1;0)
.
To prove statement (iii), when one rm innovates under the base case and neither
rm innovates under upstream integration, we have
4  2d2
4  2d2   d
W + 
2
(1 + )
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
q0(1;0)
>
W
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
qT (0;0)
. 
2.7.10 Proof of Proposition 5
To prove statement (i), when one rm innovates under the base case and both rms
innovate under downstream integration, we have
4  2d2
4  2d2   d
W + 
2
(1 + )
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
q0(1;0)
<
W +  (1 + )
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
qB(1;1)
for W < W y1  (2+d)(1 d)(1+)d .
To prove statement (ii), when neither rm innovates under the base case and both
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rms innovate under downstream integration, we have
4  2d2
4  2d2   d
W
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
q0(0;0)
<
W +  (1 + )
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
qB(1;1)
for W < W y2 
(4 d 2d2)(1+)
d
.
To prove statement (iii), when neither rm innovates under the base case and one
rm innovates under downstream integration, we have
4  2d2
4  2d2   d
W
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
q0(0;0)
<
W + 
2
(1 + )
(2  d) (1 + d)| {z }
qB(1;0)
for W < W y3 
(4 d 2d2)(1+)
2d
.
It can be checked thatW y1 < W
y
2 < W
y
3 and that the interval

W;W y1

is non-empty
for  < d
2+d 2(1 d) d3
2(1 d)+d3 , which can occur in all the scenarios that have been studied.
For W > max
n
W y2 ;W
o
the opposite results are obtained. 
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Chapter 3
The Determinants of Partner
Choice for Cooperative Innovation:
The E¤ect of Competition
Comments and suggestions given during the 3rd Ph.D. Workshop on Industrial and
Public Economics (WIPE), at Universitat Rovira i Virgili of Tarragona (Spain),
helped to improve this chapter.
3.1 Introduction
Firms consider cooperation to be a key innovation strategy for widening their techno-
logical base in a competitive environment where innovation is growing in complexity,
risk, and cost. Research partnerships facilitate the access to complementary re-
sources, the deployment of new skills and capabilities, and the sharing of the costs
and risks related to innovation (Staropoli, 1998; Grant and Bade-Fuller, 2004; Lavie,
2006). This allows for economies of scale and fosters the development of competitive
advantages, all of which leads to an improvement of rmsstrategic position (Teece,
1986; Lavie, 2006).
The industrial organization literature has shown that R&D cooperation is de-
termined by competition in the product market, spillovers, and R&D investments.
Collaborative agreements make it possible for rms to protect knowledge spillovers
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(López, 2008), improving rmscompetitive position. Therefore, market structure
can be a¤ected by research partnerships (Hagedoorn et al., 2000).
The promotion of cooperative R&D has been a central policy tool to enhance the
rmscompetitiveness, mainly in the high-tech sectors. However, R&D collabora-
tions may also harm competition in the product market since they can be used as a
subterfuge to sustain tacit collusion agreements, especially in the case of collabora-
tion among rival rms (Duso et al., 2014; Flores-Fillol et al., 2014).
Despite its importance to explain the rmsdecision to cooperate in R&D, the
empirical literature has not considered competition intensity as a determinant of
R&D cooperation. This is probably due to the lack of information regarding rms
competitive environment. This study is the rst to address this question by using
new data to assess the e¤ect of competition intensity on the decision to cooperate in
R&D with di¤erent types of partners.
While the relationship between R&D cooperation and competition has not been
addressed, the relationship between competition and innovation has captured the
interest of many authors. Aghion et al. (2005) nd evidence of an inverted-U re-
lationship between competition and innovation. We connect the literature on R&D
cooperation and the ndings provided by Aghion et al. (2005) to elucidate, empiri-
cally, how competition a¤ects rmsdecision to cooperate in R&D with a certain type
of partner.1 We make use of two di¤erent measures to capture competition intensity:
the number of competitors in the core market and the price elasticity reported by
rms.
Following the existing literature, we control for rmscharacteristics, innovation
obstacles, and appropriability conditions to explain the determinants of rmspart-
ner choice. Our analysis uses the Mannheim innovation panel (MIP), which provides
information from rms located in Germany. The survey focuses on rmsinnovative
activities and provides useful information on cooperative agreements. We select the
2011 survey wave because it provides valuable information on rmsmarket structure.
Our study focuses on a subsample of innovative manufacturing rms. Six di¤erent
1In some studies competition has been approximated by general or indirect measures, such as
exports as a proxy for rmsparticipation in more competitive markets, and the Herndahl index
used by Becker and Dietz (2004) to estimate the impact of competition on the rms propensity to
cooperate.
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types of collaborative partners are considered as dependent variables: 1) customers,
2) suppliers, 3) competitors, 4) universities, 5) rms of the same group, and 6) con-
sultants.2 The considered explanatory variables are: competition intensity (number
of competitors in the core market and price elasticity), rms characteristics, impor-
tance of appropriability measures, obstacles to innovation, and dummy variables for
industries. A set of logit specications is used to estimate the probability of the rm
to conduct cooperative agreements in general, and with a certain type of partner in
particular.
The main ndings can be summarised as follows. Competition intensity does
not a¤ect German rms propensity to cooperate in general. Nevertheless, it is an
important determinant in rmsdecision to cooperate in R&D with a certain type
of partner in particular. More precisely, the e¤ect of competition is negative in the
case of cooperation with universities, customers, and rms of the same group; and
it is positive in the case of cooperation with suppliers and competitors. The nega-
tive e¤ect of competition intensity on partnerships with customers and universities
is explained by the search of radical innovations and the high risks of disclosure. In
contrast, the positive e¤ect of competition intensity on partnerships with suppliers
and competitors is explained by the search of incremental innovations and a symmet-
ric risk of information disclosure. These ndings lead to the conclusion that market
competition and appropriability measures are the main determinants of the German
rmsdecisions to cooperate with particular types of partner.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the litera-
ture. Section 3 presents some stylised facts, the data, describes the variables and
the empirical model. The results and their discussion are presented in Section 4
and Section 5, respectively. Finally, a brief concluding section closes the paper.
3.2 Literature Review
It is well known that innovation is a crucial factor for competitiveness in an en-
vironment with an accelerated pace of technological progress, which leads rms to
23) also includes rms from the same industry. 4) also includes public research centres. 6) also
includes commercial laboratories, and private R&D institutions.
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broaden their innovative capabilities (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). According with
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), successful innovation depends on the development
and integration of new knowledge in the innovation process. In this context, innova-
tive cooperation allows rms to develop new knowledge and to incorporate external
knowledge into the innovation process (Colombo, 1998). Many authors point out that
rms engage in cooperative agreements with the purpose of combining their own spe-
cic assets and core competencies with other rms that have complementary assets
and competencies which cannot be acquired independently (Sakakibara, 2001; López,
2008). Other authors argue that collaboration is a means of shaping competition by
improving a rms competitive position (Hagedoorn et al., 2000). Such collaborative
behaviour protects and reinforces rmsexisting competitive advantages and creates
new ones.
There is a vast volume of literature that analyses why rms enter into collabo-
rative innovation and what the results of such collaborative agreements are. Firms
cooperative behaviour can largely be explained from two main literature approaches.3
First, the theoretical approach, in which most of the analyses have been addressed
from an industrial organisation perspective, particularly using game-theory tools to
study the relative e¢ ciencies of competition and cooperation in R&D in raising nal
output and enhancing social welfare (Hagedoorn et al., 2000).4 Second, the empiri-
cal approach from a resource-based perspective (Lowe and Taylor, 1998; Fritsch and
Lukas, 2001; Tether, 2002; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003), which explains that inno-
vation partnerships can facilitate rmsaccess to external complementary resources.
These complementarities could yield competitive advantages that would ultimately
improve the strategic position of rms in competitive markets (Teece, 1986; Lavie,
2006).
In the theoretical literature, cooperation among rms is used, mainly, as a means
of internalizing technological externalities (Colombo, 1998; Hanaki et al., 2007).
3Many authors explain R&D cooperation considering the transaction cost approach, which
analyses the conditions under collaborative agreements are the most e¢ cient form of organization.
This approach rests on the idea of cost minimization, but does not capture many of the strategic
advantages of cooperation such as knowledge sharing, or advantages of cooperation depending on
the partner choice (Williamson, 2002; Arranz and Fdez. de Arroyabe, 2008).
4Into this theoretical approach, a separate mention is given to the economics networks, which
analyses collaborative incentives to reduce production costs in an environment of market competi-
tion, although this approach does not address particularly R&D collaboration.
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Most of the authors make use of game-theory models to examine the e¤ects of R&D
cooperation on R&D investment, on equilibrium prices and output, and on social wel-
fare, considering oligopoly competition. The seminal works of Brander and Spencer
(1983), Spence (1984), Katz (1986), and dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) show
that cooperation in R&D can be welfare-enhancing due the increment on R&D in-
vestments when the spillovers are large enough and when there is competition in
the product market. DAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) present a duopoly model,
which is extended by Suzumura (1992) to oligopoly competition in quantities, and
by Kamien et al. (1992), who analyse R&D cartelisation and joint research ventures.
This branch of the literature provides a framework for the analysis of the e¤ect
of cooperation that depends on the nature of market competition and the market
structure in which rms are embedded.
In the literature of economic networks, R&D cooperation has been studied with
interesting results in a seminal paper by Goyal and Joshi (2003). The authors analyse
networks of collaboration in an oligopoly context, and show how the rmsincentives
to collaborate are inuenced by the nature of market competition and the costs of
forming links. They conclude that rms collaborate to generate competitive advan-
tages and demonstrate that, when the costs of forming links are small, the empty
network is the unique stable result under price competition. This suggests that, in a
general setting with erce price competition, collaborative links are not established.
Billand and Bravard (2004) extend Goyal and Joshis (2003) model, nding that
collaboration arises as an equilibrium result under Bertrand competition.5
The empirical literature from a resource-based perspective of cooperation consid-
ers that strategic cooperation arises when rms in vulnerable strategic positions need
the resources that cooperation brings (Arranz and Fdez. de Arroyabe, 2008). Coop-
eration improves the strategic position of rms in competitive markets by providing
resources from other rms that enable them to share costs and risks (Staropoli, 1998;
Grant and Bade-Fuller, 2004; Lavie, 2006). This perspective emphasises the strategic
factors, the characteristics of the rms, and the idea of needs and opportunities. The
literature derived from this approach focuses, on the one hand, on the identication
5Although Goyal and Joshi (2003) do not focus particularly on R&D collaboration, they point
out that their results can explain the cooperative incentives that motivate the behavior of a set of
rms who are competing to apply for a patent for a cost-reducing technological process, where the
patent race is won by a group of collaborative rms.
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of cooperation determinants, which can be grouped into (i) a rms characteristics,
(ii) appropriability conditions, and (iii) obstacles to innovation; and, on the other
hand, it also focuses on the analysis of the impact of R&D collaboration on the inno-
vation output, which is strongly related to the chosen cooperative partner. The main
ndings on the determinants of cooperation and on the e¤ects that the cooperation
with certain partners have on innovation are explained below.
3.2.1 Determinants of cooperation
Firmscharacteristics
Firm characteristics that have an e¤ect on the cooperation decision are rm size,
R&D intensity, participation in a group of rms, export intensity, proportion of
employees with a university degree, and technological level.
Firm size. Most of the authors nd that size has a positive and signicant e¤ect
on the propensity to cooperate in R&D. Size is measured as the number of employees
or sales (Link and Bauer, 1987; Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1992; Vonortas, 1997:
Fritsch and Lukas, 2001; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Becker and Dietz, 2004;
Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005; Cassiman et al., 2007; Arranz and Fdez. de Arroyabe,
2008; López, 2008; de Faria et al., 2010). However, Kleinknecht and Reijnen (1992)
nd that size and R&D intensity only matters for private rms which cooperate
with public research institutions, but not in their relationships with other private
rms. Belderbos et al. (2006) nd no signicance of rm size on the probability
of cooperation, although the authors include other independent variables that are
positively and signicantly related to size, such as investment intensity and being
part of a foreign group.
R&D intensity. Size and R&D intensity are found to be associated, as gener-
ally larger rms also have a higher investment in R&D, which is often considered as
the basic input of innovation. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) point out that external
knowledge is more e¤ective for rmsinnovation processes when the rms undertake
their own R&D. It has been shown that the higher the R&D intensity, the greater the
propensity for R&D cooperation (Becker and Dietz, 2004; Negassi, 2004; Sampson,
2007). According with Link and Bauer (1987), R&D capital determines rmsab-
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sorptive capacity, their ability to identify new technological opportunities, and their
capacity to establish collaborative agreements. However, König et al. (1994) and
Vonortas (1997) do not nd a signicant relationship between R&D intensity and
cooperation. Finally, Fritsch and Lukas (2001) nd that R&D intensity has a positive
e¤ect on the probability to cooperate with suppliers and research institutes, but that
it negatively inuences the propensity to cooperate with customers and competitors.
Group. Being part of a group can inuence a rms likelihood to cooperate
(Dachs et al., 2008), given that the integration of the rm into a group may indicate
access to a substantial pool of resources (Lowe and Taylor, 1998; Miotti and Sach-
wald, 2003). According to de Faria et al. (2010), rms that belong to a formal group
are more likely to search for knowledge outside their boundaries and to engage in
cooperation activities.
Export intensity. Export intensity (share of exports in turnover) is generally
included in the analyses to capture the intensity of the competition that a rm faces
(Abramovsky et al., 2009; de Faria et al., 2010). Frequently, it is also considered as
a proxy of rmscompetitiveness since rms that participate in more competitive
environments usually are more export intensive (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002).
According to Dachs et al. (2008), rms that sell large parts of their production
abroad are also more likely to cooperate in R&D. Export intensity and being part
of a group are characteristics that can be associated with size, and many authors
assume that they also measure rms competitiveness.
Personnel education. The degree of personnel education is commonly associ-
ated with a rms capacity to capture externalities (de Faria et al., 2010). It has been
found that rms with a greater proportion of personnel with a university degree are
more likely to engage in R&D cooperation agreements, and give more importance to
the management of knowledge spillovers.
Technological level. According with many authors, a rms technological level
is a determinant of collaborative behaviour. In this regard, rms that seek R&D
cooperation tend to be concentrated in the high-tech and medium-high-tech sec-
tors, since these rms conduct more expensive, risky, or complex innovation projects
(Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Becker and Dietz, 2004; Arranz and Fdez. de Arroy-
abe, 2008). Some authors indicate that cooperative relationships are more common
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between rms that belong to high-tech industries (Kotabe and Swan, 1995; Yasuda,
2005; Vuola and Hameri, 2006).
Appropriability conditions
Appropriability is intrinsically associated with cooperation, since it a¤ects the rms
ability to protect the returns from cooperative innovation (Cassiman and Veugelers,
2002). Appropriability conditions have been deeply analysed, particularly in the the-
oretical literature. DAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992)
show that when spillovers are high enough, cooperative rms increase their R&D
investment and are more protable in comparison to rms acting non-cooperatively.
However, high levels of spillovers also lead to a free-rider e¤ect and discourage coop-
eration. Sakakibara (2001) nds evidence that cooperative projects among Japanese
industries are formed in industries with strong appropriability conditions. Cassi-
man and Veugelers (2002) show that better appropriability conditions increase the
likelihood of cooperation with customers and suppliers. Veugelers and Cassiman
(2005) nd that appropriability conditions do not a¤ect rmsdecisions to cooperate
with universities, and López (2008) shows that a high level of legal protection is a
disincentive to R&D cooperation among Spanish rms.
Appropriability conditions are considered in most empirical analyses. Generally,
these conditions are classied as legal or strategic. Examples of legal appropriability
measures of intellectual property protection include patents, utility patents, indus-
trial designs, trademarks, and copyrights. Examples of strategic measures to protect
cooperation output include commonly used secrecy, lead time advantage, and com-
plex design. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) nd that higher appropriability through
strategic protection has a positive e¤ect on the probability of cooperation.
Obstacles to innovation
Firms tend to use R&D cooperation as a means of complementing innovation inputs
and to overcome obstacles to innovation. The obstacles that are considered in the lit-
erature can be grouped into high costs of innovation, high risks of innovation, lack of
technological information, and lack of market information. Cassiman and Veugelers
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(2002) and Veugelers and Cassiman (2005) consider as obstacles to innovation: the
lack of suitable available nancing, high costs of innovation, payback periods being
too long, innovation costs being hard to control, and the high risks of innovation.
Sakakibara (2001), Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), Miotti and Sachwald (2003), Ar-
ranz and Fdez. de Arroyabe (2008), and Okamuro (2007) include in their analyses at
least one of the following variables to explain the e¤ect of the obstacles to innovation
on the propensity to cooperate: high cost of innovation, high risk of innovation, lack
of technological information, and lack of market information. According to Miotti
and Sachwald (2003), rmscooperative behaviour may be positively related to the
number of obstacles to innovation, although their results show that these obstacles do
not inuence the propensity to cooperate. Similarly, Veugelers and Cassiman (2005)
show that risk of innovation is not an important obstacle that needs to be considered
by rms when they decide to cooperate with universities. In contrast, Tether (2002)
nds a positive and signicant e¤ect of sharing costs and risks on the propensity to
cooperate. Miotti and Sachwald (2003) and Belderbos et al. (2004) qualify these
results, nding that cooperation with rivals, which is quite rare, seems to mostly be
used to share R&D costs, particularly in high-tech sectors. López (2008) nds that
cost-risk sharing is the most important determinant for cooperation with suppliers
and customers and cooperation with research institutions.
3.2.2 Impact of R&D collaboration and the importance of
cooperative partner
The impact that the choice of cooperative partner has on innovation has not been
studied to the same extent that the determinants of cooperation have. The choice
of cooperative partner is generally associated with the impact of R&D collaboration
on the rms innovation output. Most of the works have included in their analysis
the determinants of cooperation with customers, suppliers, and universities and/or
public research centres. Competitors are considered less because there is no avail-
able information on this category or the surveys observations are not large enough.
Fritsch and Lukas (2001) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) nd, respectively, that
vertical cooperation is focused on incremental innovation and development activities.
Miotti and Sachwald (2003) show that vertical cooperation has a positive e¤ect on
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product innovation, but that is not frequent in high-tech industries, rather, rms
that conduct expensive, risky, or complex research projects tend to be concentrated
in high-tech sectors. Belderbos et al. (2004) nd that competitorscooperation fo-
cus on incremental innovations, while cooperation with customers and universities
are important knowledge sources for rms pursuing radical innovations. Veugelers
and Cassiman (2005) nd that rms in high-technology sectors are more likely to
be involved in cooperative agreements with universities and research centres, and
demonstrate that cooperation with universities is complementary to other innova-
tion activities.6. Vertical cooperation is more common in medium-low technology
industries where competition discourages innovation (Aghion et al., 2005). More-
over, Becker and Dietz (2004) nd that market power enables rms to shift R&D
expenditures to suppliers through cooperation agreements. Moreover, de Faria et al.
(2010) show that cooperation with customers is focused on product innovation, while
supplierscooperation is focused on process innovation. From the above-mentioned
perspective, some studies have deepened on the determinants of this choice. Miotti
and Sachwald (2003) conclude that the choice of R&D cooperative partners is deter-
mined by the complementarity of resources for innovation for accessing knowledge
and building innovative networks. Arranz and Fdez. de Arroyabe (2008) analyse
the choice of partners in R&D cooperation among Spanish rms, nding that ver-
tical cooperation is used as a means of overcoming market and technological risks,
while cooperation with public partners is used to obtain nancing. De Faria et al.
(2010) study the importance of cooperative partners, showing that the rms which
give greater value to cooperation with suppliers and rms from the same group are
rms that belong to high-tech industries, with high levels of innovation intensity and
absorptive capacity.
Competition has not been considered as a determinant of R&D cooperation or of
the choice of collaborative partner. Only Becker and Dietz (2004) have considered in
their analysis the e¤ect of competitive conditions including a variable that measures
the degree of market concentration, nding no signicant e¤ect on the propensity
to cooperate, and negative and low signicance in the number of partners chosen.
Sakakibara (2001) analyses three decades of Japanese government-sponsored R&D
6The link between scientic knowledge and innovating rms is especially important in fast
developing technologies sectors, such as biotechnology, IT, and new materials (Mowery, 1998; Zucker
et al., 1998; Cockburn and Henderson, 2001).
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consortia, nding that rms in oligopolistic industries are motivated to cooperate
on R&D projects with industries that have higher growth. Elsewhere, the e¤ect of
oligopolistic competition on a rms incentive to cooperate has been studied theoret-
ically by dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Katz (1986), De Bondt and Veugelers
(1991), Kamien et al. (1992), and Suzumura (1992), among others, who all stress
the role of spillovers on the cooperation decision. In this regard, Hanaki et al. (2007)
point out that R&D collaboration is a strategy for controlling knowledge spillovers,
and nd it reasonable that innovative rms may want to form R&D collaboration
strategically to control knowledge externalities. Sakakibara (2001) points out that
rms in more concentrated industries have fewer appropriability problems and less
need to share innovation costs. From a strategic perspective, competition becomes a
relevant condition as a determinant of cooperative innovation behaviour, especially
considering the evidence that demonstrates the relationship between competition
and innovation. In this regard, Aghion et al. (2005) nd an inverted-U relationship
between competition and innovation. Competition discourages laggard rms from
innovating but encourages innovation among neck-and-neck rms which operate at a
similar technological level. Innovation incentives depend upon the di¤erence between
post-innovation and pre-innovation rents of incumbent rms. More competition may
encourage innovation and growth, because it may reduce a rms pre-innovation
rents by more than it reduces its post-innovation rents. Competition may increase
the incremental prots from innovating, and thereby foster R&D investments aimed
at escaping competition among neck-and-neck rms. In the neck-and-neck sectors,
pre-innovation rents should be especially reduced by product market competition. In
sectors where innovations are made by laggard rms with already low initial prots,
product market competition will mainly a¤ect post-innovation rents, and therefore
the Schumpeterian e¤ect of competition should dominate. Aghion et al. (2005)
point out that neck-and-neck industries show a higher level of innovation activity for
any level of product market competition, which only occurs in industries considered
high-tech.7
7Industries such as aerospace, pharmaceuticals, machinery, IT-telecommunications, and scien-
tic instruments face neck-and-neck competition, where there is an innovations race to sustain a
comparative and competitive advantage in the market.
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3.3 Empirical Study
3.3.1 Stylised Facts
Most of the literature has focused on cooperation as a way to complement capabili-
ties and resources to overcome innovation obstacles. The present empirical analysis
contributes to the literature by including market structure as a determinant of coop-
eration. The market structure is approximated by two di¤erent variables: the number
of competitors in the relevant market, and a measure of price elasticity. In addition,
di¤erent types of cooperative partners are considered: 1) customers, 2) suppliers, 3)
competitors, 4) universities, 5) rms of the same group, and 6) consultants.
From the previous literature, the following stylised facts allow the e¤ect of market
structure on cooperation with a certain partner type to be deduced. First, R&D co-
operation, which allows rms to develop new knowledge and to incorporate external
knowledge into the innovation process, is a crucial aspect for successful innovation.
Second, as there is an inverted-U relationship between competition intensity and
innovation, and as R&D cooperation is a fundamental input for innovation, the re-
lationship between competition intensity and R&D cooperation should also be (typ-
ically) inverted-U shaped. Third, appropriability conditions are an important factor
for R&D cooperation. Fourth, R&D cooperation with customers and universities has
a positive e¤ect on radical product innovation, which is more common in high-tech
industries. Fifth, R&D cooperation with suppliers and competitors has a positive
e¤ect on incremental process innovation (mainly focused on input cost reduction and
quality improvement).
Following these stylised facts, the empirical analysis studies the e¤ect of compe-
tition intensity on R&D cooperation. In particular, we identity the determinants of
R&D cooperation with a certain partner type. In the following section, we describe
the data and the variables, and the considered empirical model.
3.3.2 Data and Variables
The MIP is a micro dataset based on annual data that captures the innovation
behaviour of German rms. The innovation survey covers rms with at least ve
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employees and from various industries, and which are representative for Germany,
allowing projections about the population of German rms. This survey is conducted
by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of the Federal
Ministry of Education and Research, in cooperation with the Institute of Applied
Social Science and the Institute for Systems and Innovation Research. The MIP
is the German contribution to the European Commissions Community Innovation
Surveys (CIS).
For this analysis, the 2011 wave of the MIP is used, which provides valuable
information on rmscompetition environment. Particularly, the survey includes in-
formation regarding the number of competitors in the rms relevant market, and a
proxy for price elasticity. Each rm responds directly about the number of competi-
tors that participate in their core market. Regarding price elasticity, rms indicate
to what extent the characteristic "price increases lead to immediate loss of clients"
describes their competitive situation. The respondents can indicate whether the de-
scribed characteristic applies fully, applies somewhat, applies very little, or does not
apply. With this information a categorical variable is built with three categories: (1)
does not apply at all or very little, which indicates low price elasticity, (2) applies
somewhat, which indicates intermediate price elasticity, and (3) applies fully, which
indicates high price elasticity. The price elasticity variable allows the intensity of
price competition to be approximated. As the two questions regarding number of
competitors and price elasticity are not part of the regular questionnaire, it is not
possible to construct a panel dataset. The 2011 wave also contains general infor-
mation on rms, e.g. the number of employees, the number of employees with a
university degree, and exports as a percentage of turnover, among others. More im-
portantly for the purpose of this study, the survey contains data on innovation and
R&D activities, for example on whether rms have undertaken continuous R&D ac-
tivities in the last three years, R&D expenditures as a percentage of turnover, use of
legal and strategic measures to protect intellectual property, obstacles to innovation
such as high costs and risk of innovation, lack of technological information, and lack
of market information.
This study concentrates on manufacturing rms, given that collaboration in R&D
is more frequent in these industries. The sample includes 3; 606 rms. 55:5% (2; 000)
of these rms report innovation in products or processes in the last three years
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(2008   2010).8 However, only 19:1% (688 rms) report cooperative agreements on
innovation activities in this time. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics (mean)
of the innovative manufacturing rms of the sample. The descriptive statistics show
the di¤erences between the rmscharacteristics depending on their collaborative
partners. The statistics demonstrate that rms which cooperate with partners of the
same group are the those with the largest number of employees, those that show the
greatest proportion of exporters, and those that give the most importance to legal
measures of intellectual property protection. Firms that collaborate with customers
show the highest R&D intensity, while rms that cooperate with competitors have
the greatest proportion of employees with a university degree, and are the rms that
give the most importance to the three obstacles of innovation considered, i.e., high
cost and high nancial risk, lack of technological information, and lack of market
information. These rms also report the greater importance of strategic measures
for their innovation output. Regarding the competition variables, it is shown that
the sample mean of the number of competitors is higher than the average number
of competitors of cooperative rms, i.e. cooperative rms face a lower number of
competitors.9 Focusing on cooperative rms, the ones that cooperate with competi-
tors report that they face the highest number of competitors in their core market.
Observing the variable that measures price elasticity, it is shown that rms which
cooperate with rivals have the highest price elasticity reported by cooperative rms.10
Analysing the proportion of rms that cooperate with certain types of partner
by industry, we observe that: cooperation with rms of the same group is preferred
in the food-tobacco, chemical, and glass-ceramic industries; cooperation with cus-
tomers is the most common among rms from the metal industry; rms from wood,
plastic, and furniture industries cooperate the most with suppliers; cooperation with
competitors is the most frequent among rms from the mining, transportation, and
telecommunications industries; cooperation with universities is preferred by electric-
equipment manufacturers; and cooperation with consultants is the most common
among rms from the textile and machinery industries.
8We focus attention on innovative rms, as it is only rms that respond a¢ rmatively to inno-
vation questions that are able to respond to cooperative questions of the survey.
9Undertaking a t-test we nd evidence that the di¤erence between the sample mean of the
number of competitors and the mean of cooperative rms is signicant at 5%.
10The null hypothesis of equal means is rejected under the t-test.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics for innovative and cooperative firms (mean).
Variable
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Fi rm’s c h ara cte r is t ic s
Size 3.6023 3.9649 3.6864 4.5816 4.6510 4.7630 4.9833 4.7987 5.4223 5.0026
Exports 0.5897 0.7182 0.6741 0.8564 0.8920 0.8431 0.7979 0.8912 0.9086 0.8737
Univ 0.3271 0.3998 0.3399 0.5294 0.5410 0.5187 0.6263 0.5893 0.5644 0.5512
Rdicat 1.6197 2.1176 1.7550 2.8395 2.9386 2.8739 2.8375 2.8903 2.9209 2.8216
Compet i t ion
Competitors 2.7292 2.7019 2.7146 2.6404 2.5861 2.6436 2.6700 2.5978 2.5238 2.7087
Pricecat 1.7085 1.6766 1.6696 1.6547 1.6014 1.6953 1.7692 1.6381 1.6343 1.6493
Appropr iabi l i ty
Legal 0.1541 0.2325 0.1727 0.3518 0.3572 0.3907 0.3847 0.3899 0.4643 0.3956
Strategic 0.2852 0.4243 0.3521 0.5811 0.6224 0.6008 0.6519 0.6208 0.6185 0.6008
Obstac les to  innovat ion
Cost_risk 0.4974 0.5942 0.5780 0.6367 0.6683 0.7282 0.7391 0.6312 0.6776 0.6623
Lack-teck 0.1235 0.1478 0.1431 0.1551 0.1733 0.2030 0.2055 0.1693 0.1419 0.1667
Lack_mkt 0.1463 0.1767 0.1545 0.2114 0.2453 0.2282 0.2949 0.2371 0.2360 0.1892
Industr ies
Mining 0.0696 0.0435 0.0472 0.0334 0.0277 0.0279 0.0648 0.0412 0.0493 0.0415
Foodt 0.0899 0.0805 0.0954 0.0363 0.0173 0.0314 0.0093 0.0351 0.0359 0.0184
Textil 0.0585 0.0540 0.0530 0.0480 0.0484 0.0557 0.0370 0.0495 0.0493 0.0645
Woodp 0.0549 0.0490 0.0588 0.0232 0.0173 0.0348 0.0093 0.0144 0.0179 0.0276
Chemical 0.0527 0.0720 0.0597 0.1076 0.1384 0.1115 0.1111 0.1155 0.1390 0.1106
Plastic 0.0538 0.0540 0.0539 0.0610 0.0588 0.0662 0.0278 0.0515 0.0628 0.0507
Glassc 0.0374 0.0355 0.0337 0.0407 0.0415 0.0418 0.0370 0.0392 0.0628 0.0369
Metal 0.1078 0.0975 0.1050 0.1003 0.1176 0.0906 0.0741 0.1052 0.0942 0.1106
Electric 0.0990 0.1375 0.1127 0.1962 0.1903 0.1533 0.1759 0.1979 0.1749 0.1567
Machinery 0.0765 0.1095 0.0963 0.1497 0.1661 0.1533 0.0926 0.1670 0.1435 0.1843
Furniture 0.0987 0.0980 0.1012 0.0770 0.0623 0.1045 0.0741 0.0701 0.0807 0.0737
Transport 0.1328 0.0800 0.0877 0.0378 0.0277 0.0488 0.1111 0.0268 0.0269 0.0691
Telecom 0.0682 0.0890 0.0954 0.0887 0.0865 0.0801 0.1759 0.0866 0.0628 0.0553
Obs. 3606 2000 1038 688 289 287 108 485 223 217
See Table A1 for the description of the variables.
As mentioned above, six di¤erent types of partners are considered: 1) customers,
2) suppliers, 3) competitors, 4) universities, 5) rms of the same group, and 6)
consultants. Table 2 describes the number and percentage of rms by partners. There
are in total 745 cooperative rms. 33:7% (251 rms) cooperate only with one partner,
universities being the most frequent (16:8%), followed by suppliers (6%), consultants
(4%), customers (3:6%), other rms of the same group (2:3%), and competitors
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(0:9%). 29:3% of the cooperative rms are engaged in cooperation with two di¤erent
types of partners, universities being one of these two partners in 69% of cases. Less
common is cooperation with three or more di¤erent type of partners. In decreasing
order, 18:8% cooperate with three di¤erent types of partners, 10:7% cooperate with
four di¤erent types of partners, 6% cooperate with ve di¤erent type of partners,
and 1:5% cooperates with all the types of partners considered.
The considered dependent variables are a general measure of R&D coopera-
tion (coop) and a specic measure of cooperation with each partner (coop_cust,
coop_supp, coop_comp, coop_unires, coop_gr, coop_cons).11 12 To explain the
choice of cooperative partner, independent variables grouped into ve categories are
considered: rm characteristics, market characteristics, appropriability measures,
obstacles to innovation, and industries. According to the literature, the following
rm characteristic variables are included: size, exports, personnel with a university
degree above the sample mean (univ), and R&D intensity (#rdicat). Two variables
are included to measure appropriability: the use and importance of (i) legal and (ii)
strategic measures as a means of protecting intellectual property.13 In the legal cate-
gory are considered: applications for patents, the registration of trademarks, and the
use of copyrights. In the strategic measures are included: secrecy, complex design,
and lead time advantage over competitors. Three dichotomic variables are includes
as obstacles to innovation: high innovation costs and risks (cost_risk),14 lack of
technological information (lack_tech), and lack of market information (lack_mkt).
These obstacles can lead to the extension, the end or the discontinuity of innovation
11See Table A1 in the Appendix, for a description of the variables.
12Fritsch and Lukas (2001) include in their analysis the relationship with customers, suppliers,
other rms, and public research institutions. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) consider cooperation
with suppliers and customers, and cooperation with research institutions. Miotti and Sachwald
(2003) include cooperation within interrelated groups of rms, clients, suppliers, competitors, and
universities. Belderbos et al. (2004) and Belderbos et al. (2006) consider cooperation with competi-
tors, suppliers, customers, and universities. López (2008) analyse cooperation with competitors,
with suppliers and customers, and with research institutions. Arranz and Fdez. de Arroyabe (2008)
group partners into three categories: vertical, horizontal, and public institutions. Into these cate-
gories are suppliers and clients, competitors, consultancy enterprises, and enterprises within rms
group, and government research institutes and universities, respectively. De Faria et al. (2010)
study cooperation with other rms within the rm group, suppliers, clients or customers, competi-
tors, consultants, commercial labs or R&D rms, universities, and government research institutions.
13Sakakibara (2001), Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), Veugelers and Cassiman (2005), and López
(2008) include in their studies appropriability conditions to explain the propensity to cooperate.
14We build a unique variable that measures both aspects -high innovation costs and high nancial
risks- given the high correlation between both if we consider them separately.
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projects, and even the decision not to start any innovation project at all.15 A full
description of variables is shown in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The correlation matrix is presented in Table A3 (see Appendix). Generally, corre-
lation coe¢ cients are either low or moderate and never exceed 0.6. Therefore, there
is a low risk of facing collinearity issues or redundancies with this set of variables.
The main novelty of this study is the inclusion of market characteristics as de-
terminants for cooperation with certain types of partners. As was mentioned above,
two dimensions of competition are considered: the number of competitors in the
rms core market (competitors), and a proxy for price elasticity (pricecat). The
variable that measures price elasticity captures the intensity of price competition,
and can be determined by the degree of product di¤erentiation. Three categories of
price elasticity are considered: low, intermediate (2.pricecat), and high (3.pricecat),
which correspond to independent products, partial substitutes, and close substitutes,
respectively.
15Sakakibara, (2001), Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), Miotti and Sachwald (2003), Veugelers
and Cassiman (2005), Okamuro (2007), and Arranz and Fdez de Arroyabe (2008) include in their
works variables regarding obstacles to innovation to explain the propensity to cooperate in R&D.
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Table 2
Number and percentage of cooperative firms by partners.
Manufacturing firms 3606
Cooperative firms 745 (20.66%)a
Firms that cooperate only with one partner 251 (33.69%)b
Firms that cooperate only with firms of the same enterprise
group
17 (2.28%)b
Firms that cooperate only with customers 27 (3.62%)b
Firms that cooperate only with suppliers 45 (6.04%)b
Firms that cooperate only with competitors 7 (0.94%)b
Firms that cooperate only with universities 125 (16.78%)b
Firms that cooperate only with consultants 30 (4.03%)b
Firms that cooperate with two partners 218 (29.26%)b
Firms that cooperate with two partners, being one of them a
university
150 (20.13%)b
Firms that cooperate with two partners, and one of them is not
a university
68 (9.13%)b
Firms that cooperate with three partners 140 (18.79%)b
Firms that cooperate with four partners 80 (10.74%)b
Firms that cooperate with five partners 45 (6.04%)b
Firms that cooperate with all the partners 11 (1.48%)b
a: percentage with respect to manufacturing firms.
b: percentage with respect to cooperative firms (745 firms).
3.3.3 Empirical Model
This section describes the empirical strategy. Taking into account that the dependent
variables are dichotomic (1 when a rm undertakes R&D cooperation or when it
chooses a certain type of partner), a logit regression model is used.16 The key question
is whether the competition environment a¤ects the decision to cooperate, and what
its specic e¤ect on the partner choice for cooperative R&D is. The regression
coe¢ cients estimate the impact of the independent variables on the probability that
the rm will conduct cooperative agreements in general, and with a certain type of
partner in particular. I restrict attention to innovative rms to estimate the likelihood
of cooperation. To estimate the probability of choosing a particular partner, I restrict
attention to innovative and cooperative rms.
16Many authors analyse the choice of cooperative partner using a logit model to estimate de
probability of cooperation with a particular partner. See Fritsch and Lukas (2001), Miotti and
Sachwald (2003), and Arranz and Fdez. de Arroyabe (2008).
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The logit model estimates p = Pr(y = 1jx), that is, either the probability of co-
operation in general, or the probability of choosing a particular partner to cooperate
with, given a set of explanatory variables x. Therefore, the following equations are
estimated:
y = + 1competitors+ 2pricecat+ 3size+ 4exports + 5univ + 6rdicat+
+7legal + 8strategic+ 9cst_risk + 10lack_tech+ 11lack_mkt+
+iindustry_dummies, (i = 1; :::; 13)
where y represents the di¤erent dependent variables that are estimated: coop, coop_gr,
coop_cust, coop_supp, coop_comp, coop_unires, and coop_cons, 1; :::; 11 are the
coe¢ cients to be estimated, and i are a set of coe¢ cients for industry dummies. The
thirteen industries considered in the sample are included. The estimations cluster
the standard errors on the industries to obtain a better adjustment.
The same set of independent variables is used to successively estimate rst the
likelihood of cooperation, and second the likelihood of cooperating with a certain
type of partner. The di¤erence between the two estimations is that in the rst only
the sub-sample of innovative rms is considered, while in the second the sub-sample
of innovative and cooperative rms is considered. This set of logit specications
allows a clear interpretation of the results, which are presented in the next section.
3.4 Results
This section is organised as follows. First, the determinants for R&D cooperation are
analysed. Second, the estimation results for partner choice for R&D cooperation are
discussed by grouping the explanatory variables in the following way: rmschar-
acteristics, competition intensity, appropriability measures, obstacles to innovation,
and industry-specic e¤ects.
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3.4.1 Determinants for R&D cooperation
Table 3 provides the estimates (coe¢ cients and robust standard errors) of the co-
operation variable. The robust standard errors have been clustered by industry. As
expected and in accordance with the literature, size and R&D intensity (rdicat) pos-
itively and signicantly a¤ect the propensity to engage in cooperative agreements.
Firms that have a proportion of employees with a degree above the sample mean
(univ) are more likely to collaborate in innovation. As R&D intensity (rdicat) and
employeesqualications (univ) approximate the rms absorptive capacity, the re-
sults conrm that German rms with higher absorptive capacity are more likely to
cooperate in innovation activities. Being an export rm (exports) does not appear
to inuence the likelihood to cooperate, in contrast to the majority of the results in
the literature.
Regarding competition intensity, it is found that it does not have an inuence on
the rmsdecision to cooperate. Neither the number of competitors (competitors)
nor price elasticity (pricecat) are signicant for rmspropensity to cooperate. These
results coincide with Becker and Dietz (2004), who nd that competition intensity
(measured by the Herndahl index for industrial sectors) is not signicant for the
decision to cooperate.
The results conrm the importance that German rms give to appropriation
measures when they evaluate whether to collaborate in innovative projects. The
coe¢ cients of legal and strategic appropriation are positive and signicant, with legal
measures being more signicant than the strategic ones. Obstacles to innovation
do not signicantly a¤ect the likelihood of engaging in cooperation. The coe¢ cient
estimates of cost_risk and lack_tech are positive, while that of lack_mkt is negative,
although none of the three cases are signicant.
Belonging to a particular industry appears to be relevant the explanation of why
rms collaborate on innovation. In comparison with rms from the chemical (chem-
ical) sector, mining rms are more likely to cooperate. Firms from the food-tobacco
(foodt), wood-paper (woodp), metal (metal), electric equipment (electric), machinery
(machinery), furniture-toys (furniture), and telecommunications (telecom) industries
cooperate less on innovation than their counterparts from the chemical sector. Firms
from the textile (textil), plastic (plastic), glass-ceramic (glassc), or transportation
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(transport) industries do not show signicant di¤erences with respect to rms in the
chemical industry regarding the likelihood to engage in collaborative R&D agree-
ments.17
Table 3
Logit regressions on cooperation decision
Variable COOP Variable COOP
size 0.234*** (0.068) Industryexports 0.266 (0.291)
univ 0.374* (0.222) mining 0.263* (0.142)
2.rdicat 1.650*** (0.226) foodt -0.492*** (0.106)
3.rdicat 1.844*** (0.268) textil 0.249 (0.155)
4.rdicat 2.419*** (0.295) woodp -0.957*** (0.129)
2.competitors 0.315 (0.788) plastic -0.020 (0.101)
3.competitors 0.550 (0.710) glassc -0.080 (0.082)
4.competitors 0.454 (0.752) metal -0.240** (0.118)
2.pricecat 0.118 (0.108) electric -0.282*** (0.043)
3.pricecat -0.001 (0.178) machinery -0.379*** (0.080)
legal 0.501** (0.235) furniture -0.511*** (0.084)
strategic 0.518* (0.271) transport 0.139 (0.102)
cost_risk 0.134 (0.163) telecom -0.644*** (0.165)
lack_tech 0.071 (0.198)
lack_mkt -0.154 (0.140) Constant -3.822*** (0.704)
Observations 936
Notes:
(1) The variables categories 1.competitors, i.e., no competitors, and 1.pricecat, i.e., low price
elasticity, are the references.
(2) The industry of reference is chemicals.
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
3.4.2 Partner choice for R&D cooperation
In this section, the determinants of cooperation with certain types of partners are
shown. Table 4 presents the estimation results showing that the propensity to coop-
erate with each partner is driven by di¤erent factors.
17We do not group industries by technology level, as the original allocation of sector is mixed
regarding the technological level of the rms, e.g. the industry called furnitureincludes furniture,
toy, medical technology, and maintenance rms, making it di¢ cult to classify them in only one
category of technological level.
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A rms characteristics
A rms size is found to have positive and highly signicant e¤ect on the likelihood
to cooperate with competitors, rms of the same group, and consultants. By con-
trast, size is not a determinant either for vertical cooperation or for cooperation
with universities. These results may be explained by the fact that 80% of the Ger-
man rms included in the sample have less than 140 employees, that is, most of the
rms are small and medium size. Otherwise, rms that cooperate with competitors,
consultants, and rms of the same group are larger than rms that cooperate with
customers, suppliers or universities, according to the descriptive statistics shown in
Table 1. The exports variable does not have a signicant e¤ect on the choice of
cooperative partner, coinciding with the results obtained in Table 3. The propor-
tion of employees with a university degree positively and signicantly a¤ects the
propensity to cooperate with universities and consultants, conrming the literature
results, which shows that rms with more qualied human resources have a greater
propensity to cooperate with scientic institutions. In contrast, personnel qualica-
tion shows a negative and low signicant e¤ect on the likelihood to cooperate with
customers. Finally, the results show that the R&D intensity has a positive and signif-
icant e¤ect on the propensity to cooperate with customers and suppliers. In contrast
with the ndings in the literature, German rms with high investment in R&D show
a tendency to cooperate vertically. Despite the fact that R&D intensity explains
rmsdecision to cooperate, it does not show a signicant e¤ect on the probability
to cooperate with competitors, universities, rms of the same group or consultants.
Competition intensity
The results show that competition intensity is a relevant determinant for rmsco-
operation with customers, suppliers, competitors, universities, and rms of the same
group, while it has no signicant impact on rms cooperation with consultants.
Competition intensity, measured by the number of competitors in the rms core
market, has a negative and signicant e¤ect on the likelihood to cooperate with cus-
tomers and rms of the same group. Nevertheless, the causality of these results does
not seem to be the same.
Cooperation with customers is generally associated with product innovation and/or
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radical innovation, which involves greater risks.18 Two circumstances could explain
this result. First, higher competition intensity may discourage radical product inno-
vations, given the intrinsic risk and uncertainty associated with this type of innova-
tion. Second, higher competition intensity may discourage collaboration with cus-
tomers given the risks of appropriation or disclosure of a rms valuable knowledge.
Indeed, the positive e¤ect of the strategic variable indicates that risk of appropriation
is an important issue for cooperation with customers.
Regarding cooperation with rms of the same group, the results also show that
the number of competitors negatively and signicantly a¤ects the propensity to co-
operate. Firms that belong to a group have access to a substantial pool of resources
for innovation (Lowe and Taylor, 1998). However, as the competition intensity in-
creases, these rms may seek outside cooperation to complement their innovative
skills. This could explain why an increase in competition negatively a¤ects a rms
propensity to cooperate with partners of the same group.
The number of competitors does not show a signicant e¤ect on the likelihood of
cooperating with suppliers, competitors, universities, or consultants.
Price elasticity (measured by 2.pricecat and 3.pricecat) a¤ects the propensity to
cooperate with suppliers, competitors, and universities di¤erently. The likelihood
to cooperate with suppliers is positively a¤ected by a high price elasticity. High
price elasticity (3.pricecat) indicates that rms compete with other rms producing
close-substitute products. These rms are more likely to look for cost reductions or
quality improvements to enhance their competitiveness. Cooperation with suppliers
is commonly associated either with incremental or with process innovation (Fritsch
and Lukas, 2001; de Faria et al., 2010).
Moreover, an intermediate level of competition (2.pricecat, which indicates a mod-
erate degree of product di¤erentiation) is found to have a positive and signicant
e¤ect on the propensity to cooperate with competitors,19 while this e¤ect vanishes
for a higher level of competition (3.pricecat). Therefore, competition intensity and
18Fritsch and Lukas (2001); Miotti and Sachwald (2003); Belderbos et al. (2004); and De Faria
et al. (2010) show that cooperation with customers is mainly oriented towards product innovation
and/or radical innovation.
19Cooperation with rivals allows rms to look for complementary R&D resources (Cassiman and
Veugelers, 2002), although this kind of collaboration is more hazardous than vertical cooperation
(Atallah, 2002).
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cooperation with competitors are related to an inverted U-shape manner (Aghion et
al., 2005). The reason for this is that the inherent risk associated with collaboration
with competitors diminishes as the degree of substitutability across rms decreases.
In contrast, price elasticity (2.pricecat and 3.pricecat) discourages cooperation
with universities. This means that rms in more competitive environments are less
likely to cooperate with universities. Similarly to the case of collaboration with
customers, high competition intensity may discourage collaboration given the risk
of disclosure of a rms valuable knowledge. Again, the positive e¤ect of the legal
variable indicates that legal protection of intellectual property is a relevant factor
for collaboration with universities. Furthermore, cooperation with universities is
characterised by a low degree of short-run applicability, which is important in highly
competitive markets.
Appropriability measures
The appropriability measures positively a¤ect the propensity to cooperate in general,
and the propensity to cooperate with a certain type of partner in particular.20 Legal
protection (legal) positively a¤ects the likelihood of cooperating with suppliers and
universities, while strategic measures (such as secrecy, design complexity, and lead
time advantage) foster cooperation with customers, competitors, rms of the same
group, and consultants.
The results suggest that the higher the risk of technological information disclosure
is (which is the case for cooperation with suppliers, universities, and consultants),
the more important legal protection becomes. On the other hand, the use of strategic
appropriability measures has a positive e¤ect on the propensity to cooperate with
customers and competitors. The reason for this is that these kinds of collaborative
agreements involve sharing valuable information from a commercial point of view,
which explains the importance of secrecy, design complexity, and lead time advantage
over competitors as a means of protecting cooperative output.
20Firms better prepared to protect their knowledge are more likely to cooperate in innovation
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Abramovsky et al., 2009).
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Obstacles to innovation
Concerning the obstacles to innovation, the results show that rms that face high in-
novation costs and risks (cost_risk) are more likely to cooperate with customers and
suppliers.21 Lack of market information (lack_mkt) positively a¤ects the propen-
sity to cooperate with customers. This result is easily explained, as one of the main
sources of a rms market information is clients and customers. These results conrm
ndings from the previous literature, which suggests that many innovative projects
arise as a result of the continued interaction between members of the same supply
chain. Collaboration becomes a means of overcoming mutual obstacles to innovation
and an instrument for improving the overall competitiveness of the supply chain (Ire-
land and Webb, 2007). In contrast, the lack of technological information (lack_tech)
is found not to have a signicant e¤ect on the probability to cooperate with certain
types of partners, because sharing technological information involves a higher risk of
disclosure.
21This result coincides with the ndings of López (2008), who nds that cost-risk sharing is an
important determinant for vertical cooperation.
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Table 4
Logit regressions on the partner choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable coop_cust coop_supp coop_comp coop_unires coop_gr coop_cons
size -0.037(0.083)
0.164
(0.119)
0.317***
(0.065)
0.217
(0.176)
0.526***
(0.105)
0.261***
(0.080)
exports -0.427(0.434)
-0.221
(0.443)
-0.269
(0.544)
0.337
(0.457)
0.497
(0.481)
-0.099
(0.507)
univ -0.425*(0.258)
-0.236
(0.399)
0.413
(0.354)
0.631***
(0.203)
0.385
(0.278)
0.489**
(0.235)
2.rdicat 0.976(0.727)
0.640
(0.466)
0.539
(0.751)
-0.353
(0.593)
0.134
(0.530)
0.294
(0.467)
3.rdicat 1.325*(0.739)
0.873**
(0.407)
-0.197
(0.877)
-0.082
(0.544)
0.306
(0.544)
0.463
(0.726)
4.rdicat 1.330(0.812)
0.938**
(0.409)
0.712
(0.705)
-0.233
(0.500)
0.253
(0.541)
0.444
(0.780)
2.competitors -1.595*(0.912)
0.875
(1.323)
-0.735
(0.857)
-0.478
(1.313)
-1.310***
(0.357)
-0.425
(0.982)
3.competitors -2.105**(0.962)
1.017
(1.167)
-0.380
(1.093)
-0.812
(1.321)
-1.263***
(0.342)
0.318
(1.056)
4.competitors -2.038**(0.985)
0.435
(1.360)
-0.518
(1.071)
-0.349
(1.201)
-1.222***
(0.462)
0.208
(0.791)
2.pricecat 0.271(0.253)
0.533
(0.353)
0.932**
(0.414)
-0.330**
(0.166)
-0.124
(0.300)
-0.074
(0.264)
3.pricecat -0.105(0.762)
0.869*
(0.516)
0.404
(0.512)
-0.947**
(0.473)
0.336
(0.570)
0.087
(0.640)
legal 0.053(0.306)
1.195**
(0.525)
0.319
(0.711)
1.024*
(0.603)
1.842***
(0.441)
0.901**
(0.359)
strategic 1.480***(0.488)
0.131
(0.345)
1.220***
(0.323)
0.702
(0.590)
-0.071
(0.402)
0.120
(0.483)
cost_risk 0.521**(0.224)
1.003***
(0.196)
0.221
(0.345)
0.109
(0.253)
0.271
(0.311)
0.141
(0.181)
lack_tech 0.084(0.338)
0.721
(0.503)
-0.603
(0.395)
0.127
(0.448)
-0.105
(0.413)
0.279
(0.301)
lack_mkt 0.498**(0.219)
-0.577
(0.382)
0.118
(0.391)
0.222
(0.213)
0.357
(0.352)
-0.235
(0.372)
Constant 0.122(1.019)
-3.839***
(1.358)
-4.801***
(1.177)
-0.430
(1.501)
-3.479***
(0.724)
-3.088***
(1.179)
Observations 323 319 281 366 315 316
Notes:
(1) The categorical variables have as references: 1.rdicat, i.e., no investment in R&D; 1.competitors,
i.e., no competitors; and 1.pricecat, i.e., low price elasticity.
(2) *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Industry
Table 4 presents the estimates for the industry dummies. Taking rms from the
chemical sector as a reference, the results show that rms from the electric industry
(electric) cooperate more with customers. Firms from the textile (textil), wood-
paper (woodp), plastic (plastic), glass-ceramic (glassc), machinery (machinery) and
transportation (transport) sectors are more likely to cooperate with suppliers. Co-
operation with competitors is relevant for rms from the mining (mining), textile,
glass-ceramic, electric, machinery and transportation industries. Firms from the
mining, textile, electric and machinery are more likely to cooperate with universities.
Cooperation with rms of the same group is important for rms from the mining,
textile, plastic, glass-ceramic, and transportation industries. Finally, the propensity
to cooperate with consultants is relevant for rms from the mining, textile, wood-
paper, glass-ceramic, metal (metal), electric, machinery and furniture (furniture)
industries.
The results do not show a consistent pattern which can explain the propensity to
cooperate with a particular type of partner depending on the technological level of
the industry. Thus, the results from the industry variables do not provide evidence
on the propensity to cooperate with a certain type of partner. In conclusion, the
rmspartner choice is mainly driven by competition intensity and appropriability
measures.
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Table 4 (continued)
Logit regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable coop_cust coop_supp coop_comp coop_unires coop_gr coop_cons
Industry  sec tor s
mining 0.838
(0.550)
0.132
(0.301)
1.790**
(0.697)
1.957***
(0.534)
0.695*
(0.362)
0.945**
(0.429)
foodt -1.324***
(0.347)
-0.408**
(0.207)
- 0.141
(0.451)
0.217
(0.216)
-0.039
(0.374)
textil -0.642**
(0.265)
1.020***
(0.217)
1.320***
(0.356)
1.036***
(0.208)
0.368***
(0.117)
1.270***
(0.141)
woodp -0.246
(0.267)
1.918***
(0.194)
- -1.780***
(0.207)
0.085
(0.184)
1.168***
(0.298)
plastic 0.085
(0.205)
0.634***
(0.208)
-0.059
(0.303)
0.297
(0.199)
0.681***
(0.113)
0.130
(0.135)
glassc -0.641***
(0.220)
0.310**
(0.135)
1.076***
(0.175)
0.394
(0.253)
0.542***
(0.200)
0.782***
(0.109)
metal 0.360
(0.233)
0.307
(0.223)
0.423
(0.271)
0.302
(0.268)
-0.475**
(0.216)
0.683***
(0.229)
electric 0.217***
(0.079)
0.194
(0.121)
0.948***
(0.087)
0.247***
(0.066)
0.001
(0.068)
0.299*
(0.154)
machinery -0.449***
(0.115)
0.242**
(0.111)
0.364**
(0.142)
0.532***
(0.139)
-0.764***
(0.171)
0.457***
(0.102)
furniture -0.662***
(0.209)
0.006
(0.242)
-0.142
(0.214)
0.168
(0.140)
-0.571***
(0.108)
0.319**
(0.136)
transport -0.953***
(0.345)
1.173***
(0.440)
2.507***
(0.564)
-1.102**
(0.542)
1.007***
(0.375)
0.517
(0.464)
telecom - - - - - -
Observations 323 319 281 366 315 316
Notes:
(1) The industry of reference is chemicals.
(2) *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
3.5 Discussion
In previous works, competition has either been ignored as a determinant of the
partner choice for cooperative innovation, or it has been approximated by general or
indirect measures.22 To the best of our knowledge this is the rst study that includes
competition intensity as a determinant of cooperative partner choice. More precisely,
two competition intensity variables are included: the number of competitors in the
22Many authors consider exports as a proxy for rmsparticipation in more competitive markets.
Becker and Dietz (2004) use the Herndahl index to estimate the impact of competition on the rms
propensity to cooperate.
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core market (competitors), and the price elasticity (pricecat) reported by the rms.
Our results show that competition intensity is a determinant for di¤erent types of
collaborative innovation (e.g., with customers, suppliers, competitors, universities, or
rms of the same group). Overall, the e¤ect of competition is negative for cooperation
with universities, customers and rms of the same group, and positive for cooperation
with suppliers and competitors (and ambiguous for cooperation with consultants).
In order to explain these results, the di¤erent types of collaborative partnerships
are classied in Figure 3:1 according to two dimensions: the intensity of innovation
and the risk of disclosure. While collaboration with universities and customers aims
at obtaining radical innovations, collaboration with suppliers and competitors typ-
ically produces incremental innovation (Fritsch and Lukas, 2001; Belderbos et al.,
2004; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; de Faria et al., 2010). Regarding the risk of
disclosure, it is lower in collaborations with closely-related partners (suppliers) and
in collaboration with competitors, as the incentives to disclose information are sym-
metric, and the adoption of legal protection mechanisms is a pre-requisite for the
existence of these partnerships (Arranz and Fdez. de Arroyabe, 2008). Di¤erently,
the risk of disclosure is higher in partnerships with universities and customers. Ap-
propriation does not preoccupy rms when cooperating with universities (Veugelers
and Cassiman, 2005), and the outow of sensitive information can considered as a
part of the regular ow of information between rms.
Therefore, when both the intensity of innovation and the risk of disclosure are
high (north-east region in Fig. 3:1) the e¤ect of competition on the propensity to
cooperate is negative. On the other hand, this e¤ect is positive when both the
intensity of innovation and the risk of disclosure are low (south-west region in Fig.
3:1).
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Fig. 3:1. Partnerships classication.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This study is the rst to analyse the e¤ect of competition intensity as a determinant
of cooperative partner choice. Competition intensity is measured by the number of
competitors in the core market and the price elasticity reported by rms.
Using information from German rms for 2011, the results show that competition
intensity is a determinant for di¤erent types of collaborative innovation (e.g., with
customers, suppliers, competitors, universities, or rms of the same group). Overall,
the e¤ect of competition is negative for cooperation with universities, customers, and
rms of the same group, and positive for cooperation with suppliers and competitors
(and ambiguous for cooperation with consultants). Competition negatively a¤ects
partnerships with customers and universities, which look for radical innovation and
involve high risks of disclosure. In contrast, competition positively inuences part-
nerships with suppliers and competitors, which pursue incremental innovation and
which involve a more egalitarian risk of information disclosure. These ndings sug-
gest that our results could be extended by considering the intrinsic risk of disclosure
in collaborative agreements (which is exogenous in our analysis) and the innovation
intensity of such agreements (incremental or radical innovation).
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Several limitations of the present analysis call for further research on this topic.
This study adopts a static perspective due to data availability. The use of panel data
would allow rm-specic unobserved heterogeneity to be accounted for. Furthermore,
a deeper analysis within industries would allow industry-specic appropriability and
competition conditions to be included.
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3.7 Appendix
Table A1
Description of variables
Variable Definition
Dependent variables
coop Dummy variable =1 if the firm cooperates on innovation activities during the last
three years (2008-2010).
coop_gr =1 if the firm cooperates with firms within the same enterprise group.
coop_cust =1 if the firm cooperates with customers or clients.
coop_supp =1 if the firm cooperates with suppliers of equipment, materials, components, of
software.
coop_comp =1 if the firm cooperates with competitors or other enterprises of the same
sector.
coop_unires =1 if firm cooperates with universities, other higher education institutions, or
governmental research institutes.
coop_cons =1 if firm cooperates with consultants, commercial labs or private R&D institutes
Independent var iab les
Firm characteristics
size Log of the average number of employees in the last three years.
exports =1 if the firm reports positive exports in the last three years.
univ =1 if the firm reports a percentage of employees with university degree above the
average of the sample.
rdicat# Categorical variable of the total R&D expenditure as a share of turnover. 1: no
investment in R&D, 2: 0%<x=1%, 3: 1%<x=3%, 4: x>3%.
Market characteristics
competitors# Categorical variable of the number of the main competitors: 1: none, 2: 1 to 5, 3:
6 to 15, 4: more than 15.
pricecat# Categorical variable of the level of applicability of the condition “price increase
lead to immediate loss of clients”: 1: applies not at all or very little, 2: applies
somewhat, 3: applies fully.
Appropriability
legal Legal measures that the firm used to protect its IP during the last three years, and
its importance: patents, trademarks, and copyright. x=0 if the firm has not used
any of the measures, and 0<x=1 depending on the average importance of used
measures.
strategic Strategic measures that the firm used to protect its IP during the last three years,
and its importance: secrecy, complex design, and lead time advantage. x=0 if the
firm has not used any of the measures, and 0<x=1 depending on the average
importance of used measures.
Obstacles to innovation
cost_risk Dummy variable =1 if the firm recognizes that high innovation cost and/or high
financial risk provokes the ended/discontinued, not started, or extended duration
of innovation projects.
lack_tech Dummy variable =1 if the firm recognizes that lack of technological information
provokes the ended/discontinued, not started, or extended duration of
innovation projects.
lack_mkt Dummy variable =1 if the firm recognizes that lack of market information
provokes the ended/discontinued, not started, or extended duration of
innovation projects
Industries
See Table A2 for Industries description and the equivalence with the NACE Rev.2.
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Table A2
Description of industries and equivalence with NACE Rev.2 classification.
MIP Sector Description NACE Rev. 2
1 Mining 5-9, 19, 35
2 Food/Tobacco 10-12
3 Textiles 13-15
4 Wood/Paper 16-17
5 Chemicals 20-21
6 Plastics 22
7 Glass/Ceramics 23
8 Metals 24-25
9 Electrical equipment 26-27
10 Machinery 28
12 Furniture/Toys/Medical technology/Maintenance 31-33
15 Transport equipment/postal services 49-53, 79
17 IT/Telecommunications 61-63
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3.7. APPENDIX
Table A3
Correlation matrix
co
op
siz
e
ex
po
rt
s
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iv
rd
ic
at
co
m
pe
tit
o
rs
pr
ic
ec
at
le
ga
l
st
ra
te
gi
c
co
st
_r
isk
la
ck
_t
ec
h
la
ck
_m
kt
coop 1.00
size 0.30* 1.00
exports 0.24* 0.31* 1.00
univ 0.19* -0.02 0.11* 1.00
rdicat 0.51* 0.28* 0.38* 0.30* 1.00
competit -0.06* -0.06* -0.01 -0.05* -0.07* 1.00
pricecat -0.03 -0.03 -0.07* -0.05* -0.05 0.20* 1.00
legal 0.34* 0.38* 0.34* 0.22* 0.47* -0.09* -0.04 1.00
strategic 0.38* 0.31* 0.35* 0.25* 0.55* -0.03 -0.08* 0.57* 1.00
cost_risk 0.12* 0.07* 0.12* 0.12* 0.20* 0.04 0.06* 0.15* 0.19* 1.00
lack_tech 0.07* 0.05 0.07* 0.00 0.13* 0.03 0.05* 0.07* 0.08* 0.25* 1.00
lack_mkt 0.08* 0.07* 0.09* -0.00 0.14* 0.01 0.06* 0.12* 0.10* 0.29* 0.55* 1.00
mining -0.05 0.04 -0.21* 0.02 -0.11* 0.03 0.05* -0.07* -0.13* -0.05* -0.04 -0.04
foodt -0.09* -0.03 -0.18* -0.15* -0.12* 0.06* 0.06* -0.05* -0.09* -0.04 0.00 0.01
textil -0.02 -0.09* 0.11 -0.06* -0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.03
woodp -0.09* -0.02 0.04 -0.11* -0.09* 0.02 0.03 -0.05* -0.07* -0.01 0.00 0.01
chemical 0.10* 0.05* 0.14 0.14* 0.20* -0.01 -0.03 0.16 0.15* 0.06* 0.03 0.03
plastic 0.01 0.00 0.12 -0.08* -0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.1 -0.01 -0.02
glassc 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.00
metal -0.02 0.06* 0.09* -0.11* -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
electric 0.13* 0.06* 0.20* 0.18* 0.33* -0.02 -0.04 0.15* 0.19* 0.06* 0.06* 0.04
mach. 0.10* 0.16* 0.17* 0.07* 0.21* -0.06* -0.04 0.16* 0.16* 0.07* 0.01 0.03
furniture -0.04 -0.07* -0.03 -0.05* -0.04 -0.01 -0.06* -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.00
transport -0.12* -0.06* -0.30* -0.12* -0.20* -0.05* 0.06* -0.18* -0.21* -0.07* -0.05 -0.05*
telecom 0.01 -0.09* -0.08* 0.32* -0.12* -0.00 -0.06** 0.01 0.08* 0.01 -0.02 -0.04
*Level of significance at 0.01
See Table A1 for the description of the variables
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3.7. APPENDIX
Table A3 (continued)
Correlation matrix
m
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ec
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an
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t
te
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mining 1.00
foodt -0.09* 1.00
textil -0.07* -0.08* 1.00
woodp -0.07* -0.08* -0.06* 1.00
chemical -0.06* -0.07* -0.06* -0.06* 1.00
plastic -0.07* -0.07* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* 1.00
glassc -0.05* -0.06* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* 1.00
metal -0.10* -0.11* -0.09* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.07* 1.00
electric -0.09* -0.10* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.07* -0.12* 1.00
mach. -0.08* -0.09* -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.06* -0.10* -0.10* 1.00
furniture -0.09* -0.10* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.07* -0.12* -0.11* -0.10* 1.00
transport -0.11* -0.12* -0.10* -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* -0.08* -0.14* -0.13* -0.11* -0.13* 1.00
telecom -0.07* -0.09* -0.07* -0.07* -0.06* -0.06* -0.05* -0.09* -0.09* -0.08* -0.09* -0.11* 1.0
*Level of significance at 0.01
See Table A1 for the description of the variables
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